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NOTES
The Assignment and Discounting of Consumer Installment Contracts:
Transactions Within the Periphery of the Truth-in-Lending
Act and Regulation Z
Plaintiff Glaire purchased a health club membership from defendant
LaLanne-Paris Health Spa, Inc. Defendant's practice was to offer unitary
price contracts, i.e., contracts in which the price is the same whether the
customer pays cash or in installments. Plaintiff chose to pay in installments,
as did most of defendant's customers. LaLanne then assigned the member-
ship contract to defendant Universal Guardian Acceptance Corporation, an
interlocking corporation with common ownership and control.' Universal
bought the contract at a discount of 37.5 percent, and plaintiff then became
obligated to pay Universal the full contract price in installments over two
years. These transactions represented the regular course of business between
LaLanne and Universal. Plaintiff sued LaLanne and Universal in the
Superior Court, Los Angeles County, contending that both defendants
violated portions of the Truth-in-Lending Act,2 which is part of the Consum-
er Credit Protection Act,8 by failing to disclose a finance charge. 4 The
Superior Court sustained defendants' general demurrers and plaintiff ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of California. Held, reversed: The amount of
the standard discount is a finance charge payable by the consumer, and it
must be disclosed as such. Furthermore, where the merchant and finance
company have a close and continuing relationship involving the discounting
of consumer installment contracts, both parties must make the disclosures
required by the Act. Glaire v. LaLanne-Paris Health Spa, Inc., 12 Cal. 3d
915, 528 P.2d 357, 117 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1974).
I. THE TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT
The Truth-in-Lending Act is a disclosure statute which does not regulate
the cost of credit or interest rates.5 By its own terms, the purpose is to "as-
sure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able
to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid
the uninformed use of credit."'6 Thus, the Act covers transactions involving
the extension of credit to consumers. 7 This statute has been acknowledged
by the United States Supreme Court as being reflective of "a transition in
1. Universal prepared the form contracts for LaLanne, provided most of the cash
receipts of each LaLanne gym, and bought each membership contract from LaLanne
shortly after the sale.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-44, 1661-65 (1970).
3. Id. §§ 1601-13, 1631-44, 1661-65, 1671-77, 1681.
4. Id. § 1638(a).
5. Id. § 1610(b). See Smyer, A Review of Significant Legislation and Case Law
Concerning Consumer Credit, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 37, 46 (1974).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
7. Id. § 1631(a).
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congressional policy from a philosophy of 'Let the buyer beware' to one of
'Let the seller disclose.' "8
A. Regulation Z and the "Four Installment Rule"
The Truth-in-Lending Act requires all merchants who regularly extend
credit to disclose certain information so that their customers may understand
the cost of buying on credit.9 Facts which a merchant must disclose include
the cash price, the total amount of deferred payments, the finance charge
and other charges, and the annual percentage rate of interest.'0 Failure to
make these disclosures subjects the lender to civil liability to the consumer
for twice the amount of the finance charge, with a minimum of $100 and a
maximum of $1000, plus costs of litigation including reasonable attorney's
fees.'1 Protected by the Act are natural persons obtaining credit for person-
al, family, household, or agricultural purposes.' 2 Organizations, persons
obtaining credit for business purposes, and the business of buying and selling
commercial paper are not protected by the Act.'8 Transactions in excess of
$25,000 are excluded except for real property transactions,' 4 but consumer
credit advertising is covered. 15
On its face, the Truth-in-Lending Act covers only transactions for which a
finance charge is required.'" As a result, many businesses attempted to
circumvent the Act by "burying" the finance charge in the price of goods
when they knew that most people would buy on credit. To deter this
practice, the Federal Reserve Board issued the "Four Installment Rule"' 7 as
part of regulation Z.18 This rule extends the coverage of the Act to all
credit transactions "for which either a finance charge is or may be imposed
or which pursuant to an agreement, is or may be payable in more than four
installments."' 9 The rule does not create a conclusive presumption that all
credit payments made in more than four installments include a finance
charge; instead, it imposes a disclosure requirement on these creditors so that
consumers will have all facts necessary for the informed use of credit. 20
8. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(f), 1631(a) (1970).
10. Id. § 1638(a).
11. Id. § 1640(a).
12. Id. § 1602(h).
13. id. § 1603(1).
14. Id. § 1603(3).
15. Id. §§ 1661-65. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent "bait advertising."
See Jordan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 442 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 870 (1971); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 936, 941 (N.D. Ill.
1971).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1970).
17. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1975).
18. Id. § 226. Congress gave the Federal Reserve Board the power to prescribe
regulations to carry out the Truth-in-Lending Act and to apply it to the everyday world.
15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970). See Strompolos v. Premium Readers Serv., 326 F. Supp. 1100(N.D. Ill. 1971). Regulation Z was issued pursuant to this authority.
19. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1975). One court noted that merely because the so-called
"cash" price is the same as for an installment payment plan does not mean that the
"cash" price does not include what are essentially finance charges. Strompolos v.
Premium Readers Serv., 326 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (N.D. 111. 1971).
20. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973). Facts
which must be disclosed include the number, dates, and amounts of payments, insurance
costs, balloon payments, and default provisions. The advertising safeguards of the Truth-
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B. Who Is a Creditor and What Is Consumer Credit?
The Truth-in-Lending Act applies only to credit transactions; 2I disclosures
are required only of those who satisfy the statutory definition of "creditor. '22
The Act defines "credit" as the right granted to the debtor by his creditor to
defer payment of the debt.23 The term "creditor" refers to those who either
extend or arrange for the extension of credit on a regular basis, 24 thus
categorizing two types of creditors: "arrangers" and "extenders." An arrang-
er is a seller who arranges for his customers to obtain credit from a
financier, who is the extender. 25 The arranger either receives consideration
for this service or helps prepare the contract to be used in connection with
the extension of credit. 26 In a three-party transaction involving a buyer, an
arranger of credit, and an extender of credit, both the arranger and the
extender must make the required disclosures. 27 A federal district court
recently held that although assignees of consumer installment sales contracts
(usually finance companies) do not deal directly with the consumer, they
may themselves be considered creditors if they regularly extend or arrange
for the extension of credit to consumers through the assignors of such
in-Lending Act also apply to finance companies brought under the Act by the "Four
Installment Rule." 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.7, 226.8, 226.10 (1975).
The authority of the Federal Reserve Board to promulgate these regulations has been
challenged on numerous occasions. In the most significant case in this area, the Fifth
Circuit held that the Board had exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the "Four
Installment Rule" of regulation Z because this rule extended the applicability of the
Truth-in-Lending Act to some transactions where no finance charge is imposed. Mourn-
ing v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 449 F.2d 235, 241 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S.
356 (1973). The court further held that this rule created an irrebuttable presumption
that the price paid by the consumer in credit transactions involving more than four
installments included the cost of extending credit, thus violating the due process clause of
the fifth amendment to -the Constitution. Id. at 242. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding this was a valid exercise of the rulemaking authority given to the Board by the
Truth-in-Lending Act and that the "Four Installment Rule" was a logical step taken to
deter those who attempt to evade the Act. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc.,
411 U.S. 356, 371-73 (1973).
A large majority of the cases have held that the Federal Reserve Board has wide
authority in this area, and it is improbable that anyone could successfully challenge
regulation Z on the ground that its issuance was beyond the authority of the Board.
Smyer, A Review of Significant Legislation and Case Law Concerning Consumer Credit,
6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 37, 45 (1974). For authority supporting this proposition, see N. C.
Freed Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973); Bissette v. Colonial Mortgage Corp., 477 F.2d 1245 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Gardner & N. Roofing & Siding Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 464 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp.
642 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Douglas v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 334 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Alas.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1972); Ratner v. Chemical Bank
New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Richardson v. Time Premium
Co., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CON. CRED. GUIDE 99,272 (S.D. Fla. 1971);
Continental Oil Co. v. Bums, 317 F. Supp. 194 (D. Del. 1970); Belton v. Columbus Fin.
& Thrift Co., 127 Ga. App. 770, 195 S.E.2d 195 (1972).
21. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(f), 1631(a) (1970).
23. Id. § 1602(e).
24. Id. § 1602(f).
25. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(f) (1975).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 226.6(d); see Stefanski v. Mainway Budget Plan, Inc., 456 F.2d 211 (5th
Cir. 1972); Owens v. Modem Loan Co., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CON. CRED.
GUIDE 99,099 (W.D. Ken. 1972); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp.
307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
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contracts. 28 In other words, lenders may not use sales companies as "front
men" in order to escape the Truth-in-Lending Act. In a similar case, another
district court held that a health club was just a "conduit" for the extension of
credit from the finance company to the customer.29 William Warren and
Thomas Larmore, former members of the Truth-in-Lending Staff of the
Federal Reserve Board, state: "Clearly, when a reasonable case can be
made that credit has been extended, exemptions from the Act's coverage
should be granted with caution."8 0 Indeed, the trend among courts across the
nation is to apply broadly the Truth-in-Lending Act and regulation Z to
any case which can reasonably be shown to involve consumer credit.31
II. GLAIRE v. LALANNE-PARIS HEALTH SPA, INC.:
A BROAD READING OF THE TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT
The Glaire decision contains two principle holdings. First, when a mer-
chant offers his customers a unitary price contract and then as a matter of
course sells it to a finance company at a discount, the amount of the discount
must be disclosed as a finance charge under the Truth-in-Lending Act.32
Second, when a merchant and a finance company maintain a close and
continuing relationship centering around the routine discounting of consumer
installment contracts, both parties are subject to the disclosure requirements
of the Truth-in-Lending Act. 33
The Supreme Court of California relied heavily on two federal district
court decisions to support its first holding. In Joseph v. Norman's Health
Club, Inc. 34 the defendant in a motion for summary judgment asked the
court to hold that, as a matter of law, unitary price contracts contain no
finance charges. The court refused to grant the motion and held that whether
the systematic practice of discounting installment contracts operated to
conceal a finance charge was a question of fact to be determined at trial.35
In Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc.3 6 the court went even further,
holding that the amount of the discount between the spa and the bank was
actually a finance charge, denying defense motions for summary judgment,
28. Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955, 964 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
The court also rejected the finance companies' argument that assignees of installment
contracts should not be considered creditors because the customers do not become
obligated to them until the contracts are signed, which is subsequent to the time whendisclosures are required. The court held that under this theory no one would be a creditor
under the Act because there would never be a creditor until after the debtor signed his
contract. This argument was also rejected in Glaire. 12 Cal. 3d at 925, 528 P.2d at 363,
117 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
29. Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 334, 336 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
30. Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of Coverage, 24 STAN. L.
REV. 793, 809 (1972).
31. See notes 19-20 and 27-29 supra and note 37 infra and accompanying text. But
see Rootberg v. American Express Co., 352 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Garland v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Castaneda v. Family Publications
Serv., Inc., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CON. CRED. GUIDE 99,564 (D. Colo.
1971).
32. 12 Cal. 3d at 926, 528 P.2d at 364, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
33. Id.
34. 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
35. Id. at 318.
36. 363 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
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and granting summary judgment for the plaintiff consumers.3 7 Glaire follows
the lead of Kriger in holding that the amount of the discount represents a
finance charge. 8 The California court indicated that since the "Four
Installment Rule" is intended to deter the practice of burying finance
charges, the rule should be applied strictly in any case in which it appears
that the merchant is attempting to bury a finance charge in the price of the
product.8 9
The second holding of the court in Glaire may provide a strong precedent
for extending the coverage of the Truth-in-Lending Act. The court examined
the relationship between the finance company and the health spa and
concluded that the finance company was a creditor as defined by the Act.40
Due to the continual dealings between the spa (seller) and the finance
company, the finance company was considered to be the extender of
consumer credit which the seller had merely arranged.4 1 Thus, the finance
company could not evade the provisions of the Act.42 It might be argued
that Glaire and similar cases have extended the Act too far by bringing in
parties whose coverage was not contemplated by Congress. In dealing with
this issue, one federal district court stated that the "Four Installment Rule"
may regulate some activities which do not fall under the specific language of
the Act but are only within its "penumbra. ' 4 The court held that this was
consistent with the authority given to the Federal Reserve Board to prevent
circumvention of the Act.
37. Id. at 336. For a case reaching a similar result see Killings v. Jeff's Motors, Inc.,
490 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1974).
38. 12 Cal. 3d at 926, 528 P.2d at 364, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 548. Kriger and Glaire also
held that it was unnecessary for plaintiff 'to allege that the spa charged a cash price lower
than the credit price in order to establish the existence of a finance charge subject to
disclosure. 363 F. Supp. at 336-37; 12 Cal. 3d at 926, 528 P.2d at 364, 117 Cal. Rptr. at
548.
39. At least one court is not willing to go this far. See Alpert v. United States
Indus., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 491 (C.D. Cal. 1973). In Alpert the facts were almost identical
to Glaire, but the court held that the plaintiff health spa member was not damaged by
the nondisclosure of the amount at which his installment membership contract was
subscquently discounted to a finance company. Plaintiff could not have used this
information to his advantage because the spa charged the same price for memberships,
whether the member paid cash or paid in installments. The only choice that the
prospective member had was whether or not to join at that price. Id. at 498.
40. 12 Cal. 3d at 925, 528 P.2d at 363, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
41. Many analogous cases outside of the Truth-in-Lending area have held that a
finance company which accepts the assignment of contracts from a seller with which it is
intimately connected still has the duties and responsibilities of a lender; the assignees
were not considered holders in due course. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d
800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971); Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881,
447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968); Lee v. Household Fin. Corp., 263 A.2d 635(D.C. App. 1970); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). Other cases have
held a merchant to be the agent of his regular financier. See, e.g., Daniel v. First Nat'l
Bank, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955); Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 220 Ark. 56,
247 S.W.2d 1 (1952); Brown v. Home Credit Co., 137 So. 2d 887 (Fla. App.), a]f'd, 148
So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1962); Thompson v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 169 Neb. 377, 99
N.W.2d 761 (1959); Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Thomsen, 80 Wash. 2d 406, 495 P.2d
332 (1972). And at least one court has held that an assignee who takes the contract
without any knowledge of any violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act is still liable if the
violation is apparent on the face of the paper. Austin v. Ohio Furniture Co., [1969-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH CON. CRED. GUIDE 1[ 99,610, at 89,584 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
42. For other authority supporting this proposition see notes 28-29 supra and
accompanying text.
43. Strompolos v. Premium Readers Serv., 326 F. Supp. 1100, 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
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The Glaire decision leaves unanswered the question of whether a finance
company which buys a few installment sales contracts at a discount but has
no intimate or continuous relationship with the merchant is an "extender"
under the Truth-in-Lending Act. This is important because if the Act is held
to cover these casual and isolated transactions, the responsibilities and
liabilities of finance companies would be greatly increased. 44
This issue has not yet been settled because most cases in this area have
involved finance companies with a close relationship to the merchant
involved. Warren and Larmore, two authorities in this field, shed some light
on this question in their discussion of the analogous issue of what constitutes
the minimum requirements for holding a person to be an arranger of credit
under the Truth-in-Lending Act. They first note the language of regulation
226.2(f), 45 which defines "arranger" as one who provides consumer credit
to be extended by another person "under a business or other relationship" by
which the arranger receives a fee or has knowledge of the credit terms and
helps prepare the necessary contract documents for the extension of credit.
Interpreting this regulation, Warren and Larmore conclude that one who
provides for credit to be extended by another is an arranger even if his fee
comes from the debtor without the knowledge or participation of the
extender. They state that neither policy nor the language of the regulation
compels a more restrictive interpretation. 46
It might be argued that a similar broad interpretation should be applied to
extenders of credit, thus making the finance company which is not closely
connected with the merchant from whom it purchases an installment sales
contract come within the definition of "extender" of consumer credit. This
argument is not persuasive, however. A finance company which is not closely
connected with the merchant would not prepare the contract documents,
would not pay a fee to the arranger (who is actually the extender), and
would have no contact with the consumer. Thus, its transaction with the
merchant should be regarded as separate from the merchant's dealings with
the consumer. The Act would be stretched very far indeed if such a finance
company was regarded as an extender of consumer credit.
As stated earlier, the extension of business or commercial credit is
specifically excluded from the coverage of the Act.47 The Federal Reserve
Board has defined this exemption to include "[e]xtensions of credit to organi-
44. The fact that these companies would have to make the Truth-in-Lending
disclosures would increase their responsibilities, and they would also have to worry about
state usury laws. Glaire held that the amount of the discount may constitute interest
which would be subject to the usury laws of California. 12 Cal. 3d at 926-27, 528 P.2d at
364, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
45. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(f) (1975).
46. Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of Coverage, 24 STAN. L.
REV. 793, 825 (1972). The authors take the position that if the person who arranges for
the extension of credit receives a fee or helps prepare the contract, he would be doing so
"under a business or other relationship" with either the debtor or the extender. There-
fore, even if he does not 'have any other contacts, the performance of the above acts
would be enough to establish the required relationship. They also state that there is no
reason for interpreting this regulation to require that the above relationship "be a
continuing one established by a series of transactions." Id. at 825-26.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (1970).
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zations, including governments, or for business or commercial purposes,
other than agricultural purposes." '48 None of the: cases dealing with this ex-
emption is helpful in determining the liability of a finance company which
buys installment contracts at a discount because each deals with direct
loans from the financier to the consumer, with the consumer using the
proceeds for business purposes. 49  But the Supreme Court of California
indicated its position in this area in the Glaire case, stating, "In so holding,
we do not . . . extend the coverage of the act to commercial credit, which is
explicitly exempted from Truth-in-Lending."50 In connection with this state-
ment, the court indicated that it was concerned that the merchant and
finance company were using this method of operation to channel credit
directly from the finance company to the consumer. 51 But this would not be
the case when the finance company is not closely connected with the
merchant. The court seems to imply that if the finance company does not use
the merchant as a "conduit" to channel credit directly from the finance
company to the consumer, then the transaction will come within the exemp-
tion given to commercial credit by the Act.
III. CONCLUSION
The Glaire decision is representative of a general trend toward broadening
the coverage of the Truth-in-Lending Act and regulation Z. The decision
goes further than many courts by holding that where a merchant offers its
customers a unitary price contract and then as a matter of course sells it to a
finance company at a discount, the amount of the discount must be disclosed
as a finance charge. Also, where the finance company has a close and
continuous relationship with the merchant, both parties must meet the
disclosure requirements of the Act.
However, this case should not be read as supporting the proposition that
whenever a merchant sells a consumer installment sales contract to a finance
company, the finance company then becomes a creditor under the Truth-in-
Lending Act. Such a finance company will come under one of three
categories: an extender of consumer credit, an extender of commercial credit
to the merchant, or not a creditor at all. The company will not fall under the
first category unless it has a close connection with the merchant and is using
him as a conduit to channel consumer credit to itself. And if it comes under
the second or third categories, it is outside the scope of the Act. Therefore, a
finance company which sometimes buys consumer installment contracts from
a merchant but has no close connection with him should not be considered a
creditor under the Truth-in-Lending Act.
Bruce R. Coleman
48. 12 C.F.R. § 226.3(a) (1975).
49. See Puckett v. Georgia Homes, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 614 (D.S.C. 1974); Brill v.
Newport Nat'l Bank [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CON. CRED. GUIDE 99,057(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Sapenter v. Dreyco, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. La.), ajf'd, 450 F.2d
941 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972).




Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co.:
Should We Refurn to a Rule of Reason?
The plaintiff,a retail liquor store, periodically sold Coors beer below cost
in an effort to attract customers. Upon learning of this pricing policy, the
local Coors distributor advised the retailer that his supply of beer would be
terminated unless this practice ceased.1 The retailer refused and his supply
was discontinued. The retailer attempted to obtain the product directly from
the brewery but was informed by the brewer that the item could only be
obtained through the local distributor. Further, the retailer was told that the
distributor could not be compelled to sell to anyone, since he was wholly
independent. A treble damage action was brought by the retailer against the
brewer for violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,2 contending that the
defendant combined or conspired with its distributors to fix the retail price of
its product and to create and enforce exclusive territories, making it impossi-
ble for a retailer to obtain the item once the local distributor refused to
supply him. The district court entered a judgment in plaintiff's favor and the
defendant appealed. Held, affirmed: A vertical territorial restriction 3 used to
facilitate a price fixing scheme is a per se violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. A product's uniqueness and susceptibility to damage if not
properly distributed does not justify practices restraining distribution. Copper
Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975). 4
I. THE SHERMAN ACT: RULE OF REASON AND PER SE CONCEPTS
In establishing the framework for a system of regulating business and
ensuring competition in this country, the Sherman Act has been hailed as
"the Magna Carta of free enterprise." 5 The principal objective of the Act is
to promote and facilitate competition by invoking the court's power to police
unlawful business combinations.6 The Sherman Act, read literally, seems to
1. The reason for the distributor's -threatened refusal to sell to the plaintiff was
disputed, but there was sufficient evidence for the court to find that it was based partly
on his fear that if he continued to sell to cut rate retailers, the brewer would enforce its
right to terminate his distributorship. The court noted that the brewer did use this power
of termination to induce distributors to refrain from selling the beer to any retailer who
refused to sell it at the "right price." Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d
934, 940 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975). For information on price fixing, see Adolph Coors Co. v.
FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal . .. ."
3. A vertical territorial restriction has been defined as an "arrangement by one
manufacturer restricting the territory of his distributors or dealers." White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963).
4. The court reversed and remanded the trial court's award of $303,033 in damages
and $75,000 in attorneys' fees, as the record did not reveal injury in fact attributable to
Coors' policy of pricing and territorial restrictions. 506 F.2d at 953. This point was
affirmed by the court when the plaintiffs petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc
was denied. Cooper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 509 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1975).
5. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
6. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman). The Senator noted
the Act's purpose when he said:
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preclude any restraint on trade; however, since 1910, following Standard Oil
v. United StatesJ the courts have ruled that only unreasonable restraints of
trade are illegal.8 The Supreme Court illustrated this rule of reason in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,9 calling for a detailed and
exhaustive study of the business and economic justifications, ramifications,
and consequences of any restraint. This type of inquiry is often expensive
and time consuming; however, it provides a party with the opportunity to
fully defend its conduct and affords the court the occasion to analyze the
practical effects of any restraint on trade.
In an effort to promote judicial economy and certainty, the courts have
eliminated the need for an extensive examination of the reasonableness of
certain types of commercial conduct by classifying certain activities as illegal
per se. 10 The rationale for such a classification was stated in Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. United States," in which the Court recognized that
certain restraining trade practices evidence sufficient pernicious effects on
competition and lack any redeeming virtue so as to preclude the necessity for
examining the reasonableness of such activities.' 2 Accordingly, per se rules
have been applied to various practices including tying arrangements,' 8
boycotts,' 4 and horizontal territorial restrictions.' 5 Additionally, per se
This bill, as I would have it, has for its single object to invoke the aid of
the courts of the United States to deal with the combinations described
in the first section when they affect injuriously our foreign and interstate
commerce and our revenue laws, and in this way to supplement the en-
forcement of the established rules of the common and statute law by
the courts of the several States in dealing with combinations that affect
injuriously the industrial liberty of the citizens of these states.
See also 1 H. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 1.7, 4.7 (1949).
7. 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
8. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
9. 246 U.S. 231 (1917). The Court explained:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains
... . The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its conditions before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint, and its effects, ac-
tual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought
to be attained are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
10. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1380-81 (Ct. Cl.
1971).
11. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
12. Id. at 5.
13. Id. "[A] tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell
one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier." Id. at 5-6.
14. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). A boycott has
been defined as "[a] combined refusal to deal with anyone as a means of preventing him
from dealing with a third person, against whom the combined action is directed . .. ."
Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1940), a ffd,
312 U.S. 457 (1941).
15. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). A horizontal territorial
restriction involves a dividing up of territories by parties on an equal marketing level.
In Sealy, all licensees selling Sealy products agreed among themselves to divide up sell-
ing territories. The Court held this to be an unlawful restraint of trade. Id. at 352-54.
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categorizations have been established prohibiting agreements to facilitate
price fixing,16 and vertical territorial restrictions. 17 These last two per se
categories, which have followed divergent paths in their respective develop-
ments and applications,' were of particular importance in Copper Liquor.
Price fixing agreements have long been held to be per se violations of the
Sherman Act,' 9 subject to one narrow exception: the seller has the right to
select the person to whom he will sell and the conditions under which sales
will be made.20 Beyond this exception, however, the per se rule against price
fixing has been steadfastly maintained.
In contrast, the per se categorization of vertical territorial restrictions has
not been so precisely defined or as rapidly accepted. The Supreme Court was
first faced with the question of whether such restrictions were in violation of
the Sherman Act in White Motor Co. v. United States.2' In ordering a trial
to determine whether the vertical restrictions constituted unreasonable re-
straints of trade under a rule of reason analysis, the Court stated that it did
not know enough of the competitive effects of such arrangements to hold them
illegal per se.22 Four years later, however, in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.,23 the Court held a similar system of vertical territorial
restrictions unlawful per se.24 Schwinn, a family-owned bicycle manufactur-
er, had assigned specific territories to wholesale distributors and had instruct-
ed them to sell only to franchised Schwinn accounts within those territories.
The Government sought to prove that this practice resulted in an illegal
vertical territorial restriction, based on a rule of reason analysis.2 5 The Court
went beyond the Government's urgings, however, and held that, with respect
to bicycle sales, vertical territorial restrictions imposed by the manufacturer
constituted per se violations of the Sherman Act. 26
16. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
17. Hobart Bros. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973).
18. See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per
Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); Van Cise, The
Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1964).
19. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). For an indica-
tion of how far the courts will go to find the necessary price fixing agreement see United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). The Court found the necessary
agreement when "the producer secures adherence to his suggested prices by means which
go beyond his mere declination to sell to a customer who will not observe his announced
policy." Id. at 43. See, e.g., Intorphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
20. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
21. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
22. Id. at 263.
23. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
24. Id. at 374.
25. Id. at 373.
26. The Court stated:
We are here concerned with a truly vertical arrangement . . . . We
conclude that the proper application of § 1 of the Sherman Act to this
problem requires differentiation between the situation where the manu-
facturer parts with title, dominion, or risk with respect to the article, and
where he completely retains ownership and risk of loss . . . . Where a
manufacturer sells products to his distributor subject to territorial restric-




II. COPPER LIQUOR, INC. v. ADOLPH COORS Co.
The Fifth Circuit in Copper Liquor27 was confronted with a situation in
which the manufacturer of a high quality product was attempting to direct its
distribution by establishing a system of exclusive territories, each with a sole
independent distributor. 28 The court reasoned that Schwinn mandated a
finding of a per se violation of the Sherman Act since Coors was attempting
to control the flow of its product after it had given up dominion over and risk
of loss for the product.29 The court further interpreted the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,30 in which a system of
horizontal territorial restrictions was struck down as violative of the Sherman
Act, as intensifying the per se rule regarding territorial restrictions.8 ' Al-
though the court recognized judicial exceptions to the Schwinn per se rule
based on a finding that a product required special safeguards in its distribu-
tion,32 the court refused to extend these exceptions to Coors' system because
"[t]he exceptions might engulf the rule itself."'38 The court found further
support for its refusal to except Coors' system from a per se categorization in
the evidence relating to price fixing.3 4 This added per se proscription caused
the court to bypass the question of whether an exception to the Schwinn rule
should be allowed.
III. PER SE VIOLATION OR RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS?
The Fifth Circuit was able to hold Coors in violation of the Sherman Act
without application of a rule of reason, since Coors' price fixing and vertical
territorial restrictions both fitted within previously determined per se cate-
gorizations. If, however, a price fixing scheme had not been involved, the
peculiar aspects of Coors' situation might have led to an exception to the
Schwinn per se rule, thereby allowing a court to test the Coors' vertical ter-
ritorial restriction system under a rule of reason.
In postulating a rationale for an exception to any per se rule, some
attention must be given to the basis of the per se concept. Per se rules are
27. 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975).
28. Coors' rationale for its centralized direction of the distribution of its product was
based on its fear that its beer would be damaged if special safeguards in shipping and
marketing were not adhered to. Id. at 937. For information on the fragile quality of
Coors beer see note 44 infra and accompanying text.
29. 506 F.2d at 947; see note 26 supra and accompanying text. The court found that
the situation presented by Coors' distribution scheme did not fit into either of the
exceptions to the per se rule applying to vertical territorial restrictions which the
Schwinn Court had stated. The court ruled, "Topco and Schwinn, read together, suggest
that at this point we must accept the fact that the Court has set its face against both
horizontal and vertical territorial restrictions, with the possible exception of vertically
imposed restrictions by 'new entrants' and 'failing companies' briefly mentioned in
Schwinn." 506 F.2d at 943.
30. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
31. 506 F.2d at 942-43.
32. Id. at 944; see note 43 infra and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Jerrold
Electronics, 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd mem., 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
33. 506 F.2d at 947.
34. See note 1 supra and accompanying text. Although the court recognized that
Coors' restrictive distribution system was an integral part in the maintenance of quality
control, it also felt such a scheme played a vital role in the control of wholesale and
retail prices, a practice per se violative of the Sherman Act. 506 F.2d at 944.
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valuable, but there should not be an expansion of their scope without careful
analysis; nor should the courts utilize such a rule as a substitute for the
necessary detailed study of a deserving case. As Mr. Chief Justice Burger
said, dissenting in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. : 5
Nor do I believe that a new per se rule should be established in dis-
posing of this case, for the judicial convenience and ready predictability
that are made possible by per se rules are not such overriding considera-
tions in antitrust law as to justify their promulgation without careful prior
consideration of the relevant economic realities in the light of the basic
policy and goals of the Sherman Act.30
The principle that per se rules should not be dogmatically followed in every
case seems particularly appropriate in light of the holding in Schwinn. That
decision has been roundly criticized by the commentators as unreasoned
from a business and economic standpoint, as exalting form over substance, as
failing to expound any new evidence of the "pernicious effect" of the
business and economic "stuff" of vertical restrictions discovered since White
Motor Co., and as relying on a common law rule against restrictions on
alienation that never really existed to the extent supposed. 37 For these
reasons, the Schwinn rule should be narrowly applied by the courts.3 8
Some lower courts have recognized the necessity of not expanding
Schwinn too far and have established limitations to its scope.3 9 The Schwinn
opinion itself postulated several permissible exclusions from its coverage,
35. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
36. Id. at 614-15. For further discussion of the proper judicial use of per se rules, see
Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 625 (1966).
37. Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review, 53 VA. L. REV. 1667, 1680-89
(1967). See also The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 235 (1967);
Note, Antitrust-Franchising-Vertical Customer and Territorial Restrictions on Goods
Sold by Manufacturer are Illegal Per Se, 13 VILL. L. REV. 192 (1967). A further
criticism of Schwinn can be made concerning the process of adoption of a per se rule in
that particular circumstance. The traditional procedure for establishing per se rules has
been that there must have been a number of cases before a court evidencing the same
practice so that the court might eventually take judicial notice of the necessary "perni-
cious effect." The Schwinn Court strayed from this procedure. See Van Cise, The Future
of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1964). The Schwinn decision also runs
counter to the observation made several years before that "[a] review of prior writings
discloses that virtually every writer on the subject of exclusive territorial arrangements
believes that such distribution arrangements are valid if they do not constitute an attempt
to monopolize or do not unreasonably lessen competition." Day, Exclusive Territorial
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Law-A Reappr'aisal, 40 N.C.L. REV. 223, 223 n.2
(1962) (emphasis added).
38. One commentator recognized situations in which vertical territorial restrictions
would not present unreasonable restraints on trade when he said:
There is a host of reasons why in particular circumstances vertical terri-
tory or customer restrictions would be entirely reasonable as restraints of
trade, particularly where their net effect is to promote competition. Ex-
amples include the need of nondominant firms to attract effective dis-
tributors, particularly where substantial capital committment at the dis-
tributor level is required, the situation where service is a major or crucial
element of marketing and interbrand competition and requires some ele-
ment of control by the manufacturer . . . the need to keep the product
out of the hands of distributors or dealers who handle it in such a way as
to hurt the public . ...
Pogue, Vertical Restrictions on Price, Territory, and Customers-The Certainty of
Uncertainty, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 272, 288-89 (1968).
39. See notes 41 and 42 infra and accompanying text.
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such as vertical restrictions imposed by new or failing companies, 40 or
situations where the manufacturer has proved an absence of any "firm and
resolute" plan in enforcing the territorial restrictions. 41 The Schwinn Court
also intimated that there might be other cases calling for an exception to the
per se rule, saying "[u]nder the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without
more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with
whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with
dominion over it."'42 Although the circumstances which would be sufficient to
create an exception to the Schwinn rule have not been precisely defined, this
phrase certainly seems an invitation to exceptions to the rule. For example,
in Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp.,4s the Third Circuit found the additional facts
necessary to bypass the Schwinn rule where the manufacturer's product was
dangerous to users or consumers if not properly distributed. In utilizing a
rule of reason analysis, the court found that if there were a sufficient lawful
main purpose for the restrictions, they might not be unreasonable. The Third
Circuit's exception to the per se rule might be expanded from situations in
which the public may be injured if the product is not properly distributed to
situations in which the product itself is likely to be damaged if its distribution
is not controlled. Evidence of the unqiueness and fragility of Coors beer was
apparently accepted by the court in Copper Liquor,44 but the Fifth Circuit
refused to acknowledge this as sufficient justification to except the distribu-
tion scheme from the Schwinn rule. 45 The court may have been too
doctrinaire in this decision, particularly since it might just have easily found
against Coors on the sole basis of the more widely accepted per se rule
relating to price fixing. In light of Mr. Chief Justice Burger's warnings in
Topco,46 the Fifth Circuit should not espouse a per se rule unless it is clearly
called for by the particular circumstances. Copper Liquor may tend to
40. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374 (1966); see White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
41. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1966); see Janel
Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938
(1968). "In United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co .... the Supreme Court premised
its finding of a per se violation on the fact that Schwinn had been 'firm and resolute' in
insisting on compliance. Here the evidence was conflicting on that issue." Id. at 406; see
e.g., Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 987 (1973).
42. 388 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added).
43. 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970). Wella was the
manufacturer of a line of cosmetic products which it sold to wholesale distributors for
resale. Most of the products were sold subject to the restriction that they only be sold to
professionals and not to the general public since the products could prove dangerous if
not properly administered. Tripoli sold some of the restricted products directly to
consumers and upon Wella's termination of its distributorship, Tripoli sued, alleging a
violation of the Sherman Act. The court refused to apply the Schwinn per se proscription
due to the lawful main purpose for the restrictions, either to protect the public or to
shield the manufacturer from product liability suits. 425 F.2d at 938.
44. 506 F.2d at 937. The court discussed the uniqueness of Coors beer, including the
fact that Coors' use of rare ingredients made it the most expensive beer to manufacture
because of its raw materials and processing, that it was brewed in an aseptic, as
contrasted with a pasteurization, process, requiring refrigeration and rotation of stock to
ensure that the beer was not damaged, and the fact that Coors required its product to be
removed from stock after it had been on the marketplace a prescribed length of time. Id.
45. Id. at 944.
46. 405 U.S. 596, 614-24 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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expand and solidify the widely criticized Schwinn rule, and since it was not
necessary to use the Schwinn rule to reach the court's decision, it was not
appropriate for the court to promulgate such an expansion.
An opportunity for the application of the rule of reason to the Coors'
system was presented in Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC,47 in which the Tenth
Circuit recognized the possible justification and necessity, due to the unique-
ness and fragile quality of the product,48 for the type of distribution system
used by Coors. Although compelled -to follow the precedent of Schwinn, the
court expressed a desire to find an exception to the Schwinn rule.49
Although certiorari was not granted by the Supreme Court in -that case, the
rule of reason should be allowed to reemerge in the exceptional situations
such as those presented by Coors' distributional scheme if our legal system
intends to adhere to the true purpose of the Sherman Act-the prohibition of
only unreasonable restraints of trade.
Even if an exception to the Schwinn rule had been applied, the Fifth
Circuit might still have held that the sytem was an unreasonable restraint of
trade. Any attempt by Coors to assert that the restraints were reasonable
because they actually promoted competition instead of hindering it would
probably have been unavailing. 50 Further, Coors' argument that restrictive
distribution was reasonable due to the susceptibility of its product to damage
was apparently not considered a sufficient justification by the Fifth Circuit. 51
Nevertheless, a rule of reason analysis would at least allow a court to
consider alternatives which are less destruotive of competition and not in
violation of the Sherman Act. Such a rule of reason analysis would perhaps
furnish Coors a blueprint for a lawful distribution scheme which would allow
the company to maintain the quality-and excellence of its product. 52
IV. CONCLUSION
Although most courts have chosen to follow the Schwinn per se rule, a few
courts, discovering some of the rule's inherent faults, have engrafted excep-
tions to its coverage. It is submitted that the situation presented by the
distribution system of the Adolph Coors Company should also be subject to
such an exception. If the Sherman Act is not read as precluding all business
restraints, the manufacturer of a quality product, easily susceptible to
damage, should be given the opportunity -to argue the propriety of its
47. 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
48. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
49. 497 F.2d at 1187.
.50. The courts have seemed unamenable to a manufacturer's argument that its
restraints on intrabrand competition actually promote interbrand competition. The re-
sponse to this argument has often been that our system does not favor a private concern
deciding whether competition in one sector of the economy is to be sacrificed in order to
enhance it in another. Instead, the courts intimate this should be a decision for Congress.
See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1972); White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 278 (1963).
51. See notes 44 and 45 supra and accompanying text.
52. See Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 945 n.6 (5th Cir.
1975). For an interesting discussion of possible outcomes concerning the question of the
necessity of a less restrictive alternative, see White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253, 270-71 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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distribution arrangement in the light of a rule of reason analysis. Per se rules
have their place in antitrust adjudication, but the courts must not accept
them "as unvarying laws of the Medes and Persians.""8 In a case evidencing
a lawful purpose for a particular restriction, an exception to a per se rule
should be allowed. In such a case the rule of reason can surely uphold the
principle and intent of the Sherman Act and provide the necessary protection
against unreasonable impairments of competition.
Lawrence Adams
Federal Intervention in State Court Proceedings:
Expansion of the Younger Doctrine by Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.
State officials invoked the Ohio public nuisance statute' in state court
against appellee's predecessor as operator of a theater exhibiting pornograph-
ic films. The trial court concluded that the operator had shown obscene
movies and rendered a judgment in appellant's favor, ordering the theater
closed for a year and the seizure and sale of the personal property used in its
operation. 2 Pursue, Ltd., successor to the leasehold interest in the theater,
immediately filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, rather than appealing the state court judgment within the
Ohio court system. Seeking injunctive and declaratory relief in a complaint
based on section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,3 Pursue alleged that
Ohio's nuisance statute constituted a deprivation of constitutional rights under
color of state law.4 A three-judge district court found that the statute was an
overly broad restraint on first amendment rights and permanently enjoined
the execution of that portion of the state court's judgment that closed the
theater to films which had not been adjudged obscene in prior adversary
53. Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1169
(1964).
1. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.01(c) (1971) provides that a place which exhibits
obscene films is a nuisance. Section 3767.06 requires closure for up to a year of any
place determined to be a nuisance and provides for sale of all personal property used
in conducting the nuisance and for release from a closure order upon satisfaction of cer-
tain conditions, including a showing that the nuisance will not be re-established.
2. State ex rel. Huffman v. Dakota, Civil No. 72-0326 (Ct. C.P., Allen City, Ohio,
Nov. 30, 1972).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
4. Pursue, Ltd. v. Huffman, Civil No. 73-432 (N.D. Ohio, Apr. 20, 1973), dis-
cussed in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 95 S. Ct. 1200, 43 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1975). The dis-
trict court concluded that Pursue had standing to challenge the nuisance statute, as the
state court judgment was directed primarily against a property interest to which it had
succeeded. Similarly, Pursue's counsel conceded at oral argument that it could have ap-
pealed that judgment of the trial court within the Ohio court system.
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proceedings. 5 Held, judgment vacated and cause remanded: In state civil
cases, such as the present, which are in many respects similar to state
criminal actions, a federal court should follow the principles set out in
Younger v. Harris8 and refuse to intervene unless the complainant establish-
es that the state proceeding is conducted in bad faith or with an intent to
harrass, or the challenged statute is flagrantly and patently unconstitutional.
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 95 S. Ct. 1200, 43 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1975).
I. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN
STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
A delicate balancing of competing federal interests is inherent in questions
concerning the propriety of federal court intervention by injunctive or
declaratory relief in state court proceedings. The protection of basic constitu-
tional rights must be considered on the one hand, and on the other, the
interests of judicial efficiency, federalism, and comity7 so necessary to the
smooth operation of a dual form of government.8
Although the Constitution, with the exception of article III limitations,9
makes no restrictions upon federal competence to enjoin a party from
participating in state court proceedings, 10 Congress sharply limited this
power with the passage of the Anti-Injunction Act of 1793,11 which later
became 28 U.S.C. section 2283.12 The Supreme Court in Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers'3 concluded that the
exceptions to section 228314 should not be enlarged by loose statutory
construction, and that proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed
to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts, with
relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and ultimately the
5. Id.
6. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
7. "Comity" as defined in Younger is a proper respect for state functions and rec-
ognition of the individual sovereignty of each state. 401 U.S. at 44.
8. See Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski,
Younger, and Beyond, 50 TExAs L. REV. 1324, 1338-48 (1972).
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
10. See Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARv. L. REV.
726 (1961).
11. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334. In its initial form the Anti-
Injunction Act had no exceptions. After undergoing -revisions in 1875 and 1911, the
statute developed into the present act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), which provides: "A
court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." For a general discussion of
the Anti-Injunction Act and its exceptions, see Comment, The Anti-Injunction Statute:
A Damoclean Sword Blunted, Sharpened, Broken, And . . . !, 22 J. PUB. L. 407
(1973).
12. This Act was at least in part a response to the pressures presented in trying to
make a dual system work and in preventing needless friction between state and federal
courts. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S.
281, 286 (1970).
13. 398 U.S. 281 (1970). Mr. Justice Black, in delivering the Court's opinion,
stated that the explicit wording of the Anti-Injunction Act itself and the principle of
a dual system of courts implies that any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction
against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts
to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy. Id. at 297.
14. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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United States Supreme Court.' 5 While there are also discretionary doctrines
of equity and federal-state comity limiting -the enjoining of state court
proceedings, this statute is an absolute restriction with expressly authorized
exceptions.'" In Mitchum v. Foster,17 which concerned a private civil suit
brought under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,18 the Supreme
Court held that section 1983 is an Act of Congress falling within one of the
exceptions of the Anti-Injunction Act.' 9 In so concluding, the Court did not
in any way question or qualify the principles of equity, comity, and
federalism that come into play as further restraints on federal court interven-
tion after it has been decided that the case does fall within one of the
statute's exceptions. 20
A. Principles of Abstention and Comity
Ex parte Young, 21 a case challenging an allegedly unconstitutional state
statute concerning sufficiency of railroad rates, originated the doctrine that,
when necessary, federal courts may enjoin state officers from instituting
criminal proceedings. There the Court distinguished between a stay of
threatened or future prosecutions as therein involved and pending prosecu-
tions, to which stays were barred. 22 The Court stated that no injunction
ought to be granted unless in a case reasonably free from doubt,28 and that
such would be justified where state officers "threaten and are about to
commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against
parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution
"24
The scope of Young was narrowed by subsequent cases25 which estab-
lished the abstention doctrine and developed the rule that an applicant
seeking a federal injunction against a state statute alleged to be unconstitu-
tional normally must exhaust his state legislative or administrative remedies
15. 398, U.S. at 287.
16. Id. at 286-87.
17. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
19. See note 11 supra.
20. 407 U.S. at 242-43. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Burger noted
that these principles allow a federal court to provide injunctive relief in only a narrow
class of circumstances, and that the Court had not yet decided how great a restraint is
imposed by these principles on a federal court requested to enjoin state civil proceedings.
Id. at 243-44 (Burger, J., concurring).
21. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
22. Id. at 163.
23. Id. at 166.
24. Id. at 155-56.
25. See, e.g., Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461 (1932) (a federal court
is without jurisdiction to enjoin the revocation of a business permit under a state Blue
Sky Law where the complainant has failed to exhaust a state administrative remedy);
Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929) (a transit company
which has applied to a public commission for leave to increase fares as prescribed by
statute cannot defeat orderly action by application -to the courts under an allegation of
an intent by the commission to deny the relief sought). But cf. McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (prior resort to a state proceeding is not a prerequisite to
maintaining a suit to assert rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, particularly when
it is by no means clear that state law provides an adequate administrative remedy),
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first.26 The abstention doctrine, whereby a federal court should refrain from
granting discretionary federal relief in cases where adequate state relief is
available,27 had its beginnings in 1929.28 The doctrine rests on two princi-
ples: the courts' reluctance to decide federal constitutional issues unless
absolutely necessary to the disposition of the case, and deference to state
sovereignty. 29 In subsequent years the abstention doctrine lost much of its
impact as a bar to federal interference in state proceedings, as it became
apparent that its strict application hindered the effective protection of civil
rights.a0
The principle of comity influenced the federal courts long prior to
development of the doctrine of abstention."' The Court has recognized that
federal interference with a state's good-faith administration of its criminal
laws is peculiarly inconsistent with a federal framework. 2 It is generally
assumed that state courts will adhere to constitutional standards, and the
mere possibility of erroneous application of those standards will not amount
to the irreparable injury necessary to justify a disruption of orderly state
proceedings. The accused should first set up and rely upon his defense in the
state courts, even though this involves a challenge to the validity of some
statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate
protection and that an injunction is needed to prevent great and immediate
irreparable injury.8 8
'B. Standards for Relief: From Dombrowski to Younger
The Supreme Court in Dombrowski v. Pfister 4 ruled that the abstention
26. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 49, at 186-88 (2d
ed. 1970).
27. See Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The
Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 535-41 (1970).
28. See Gilchrist v. Iaferborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929). This
doctrine was developed more fully in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496(1941), in which a railroad company challenged a regulation by a state commission as
unconstitutional and unauthorized by state statutes. The Court concluded that when
asked for injunctive relief, federal courts should exercise sound discretion in the public
interest to avoid needless friction with state policies. In this case decision of the issue
on the merits was withheld, pending proceedings to be taken in the state courts to secure
a definitive construction of the state statute.
29. Maraist, supra note 27, at 538-39.
30. See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972), in which
the Court, while ruling abstention appropriate in that particular case, maintained that
abstention is a judge-made doctrine that sanctions escape from immediate decision only
in narrowly limited special circumstances justifying the delay and expense which is
caused; England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417
(1964), in which the Court held that in cases where, but for -the application of the ab-
stention doctrine, the primary fact determination would have been made by the district
court, a litigant may not be deprived unwillingly of that determination. See also Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (first amendment exception to the doctrine); McNeese
v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (affirmation of civil rights exception); Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (civil rights exception).
31. See, e.g., Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
32. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
33. See, e.g., Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); Douglas v. City of Jean-
nette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89(1935); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
34. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). Dombrowski held that a lower federal court had erred
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doctrine is inappropriate in cases where statutes are justifiably attacked on
their face as abridging free expression, or are applied for the purpose of
discouraging protected activities a 5 Dombrowski was heralded as "ushering
in an era of federal judicial activism."' 36 Although the Court did not give
adequate guidance concerning the scope of the holding, many questions, left
unanswered,'8 7 were clarified by subsequent cases a8
In 1971, the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris39 and its companion
cases40 reexamined the issue. The Court in Younger held that the Dom-
browski decision should not be regarded as having upset the settled doctrines
that have always very narrowly confined the availability of injunctive relief
against state criminal prosecutions. 41 Federal courts, the Court ruled, will
not enjoin pending state criminal proceedings except under extraordinary
circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and
immediate in that there is a threat to the plaintiff's federally protected rights
which cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single prosecution.
4 2
The Court stressed that the existence of a "chilling effect" on an individual's
exercise of constitutional rights, even in the area of first amendment rights,
has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibiting
state action. 43 Although presented with an opportunity to determine the
when it had refused to grant injunctive relief against a threatened state criminal prosecu-
tion that worked a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of first amendment rights. Id.
35. Id. at 489-90. Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, commented: "So
long as the statute remains available to the State the threat of prosecutions of protected
expression is a real and substantial one. Even the prospect of ultimate failure of such
prosecutions by no means dispels -their chilling effect on protected expression." Id. at
494.
36. Note, Federal Intervention: Younger v. Harris, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 80, 82
(1972). See also Note, Implications of the Younger Cases for the Availability of Fed-
eral Equitable Relief When No State Prosecution Is Pending, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 874,
883-84 (1972). But see Maraist, supra note 27, at 565, which maintains -that the Dom-
browski holding was merely an extension of well-established legal principles to a partic-
ular fact situation.
37. Maraist, supra note 8, at 1327.
38. See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (challenged antipicketing
statute was not unconstitutional on its face either for vagueness or for overbreadth, and
since the record did not establish the plaintiffs' charges of bad faith or selective enforce-
ment designed to harrass them with no expectation of obtaining convictions, the district
court did not err in denying injunctive relief); Zwicker v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254
(1967) (federal district court should decide the appropriateness and the merits of a re-
quest for declaratory relief irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of an injunc-
tion). Contra, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (the same equitable princi-
ples relevant to the propriety of injunctive relief must be taken into consideration by
district courts in deciding whether to issue a declaratory judgment, and that where an
injunction would be impermissible, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied also).
39. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
40. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
41. 401 U.S. at 53.
42. Id. at 37. Mr. Justice Stewart stated in his concurring opinion that a threat
of irreparable injury both great and immediate might be shown if the state criminal stat-
ute in question was patently and flagrantly unconstitutional on its face or if there has
been bad faith and harrassment in a statute's enforcement. Id. at 56 (Stewart, J., con-
curring).
43. 401 U.S. at 51. The Court stated:
Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automati-
cally render them unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly
can result from the very existence of certain laws on the statute books
does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the impor-
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independent force of the Anti-Injunction Act and decide whether it would be
controlling under the circumstances of the case, 44 the Court expressly
refrained from deciding that question and instead relied on principles of
comity and "Our Federalism.' 45 A concurring opinion by Mr. Justice
Stewart in Younger,40 which involved a criminal prosecution, made it clear
that the Court was not dealing with the considerations that should govern a
federal court when it is asked to intervene in state civil proceedings, "where,
for various reasons, the balance might be struck differently. ' 47
II. HUFFMAN V. PURSUE, LTD.
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.48 the Supreme Court, for the first time facing
this issue directly, applied the Younger standard for federal intervention in a
civil proceeding. 49 The impact of the case, however, is diminished by the
Court's cautious circumscription of the rule's applicability to state proceed-
ings which are akin to criminal prosecutions.5"
Traditionally, courts of equity have shown greater reluctance to intervene
in criminal prosecutions than in civil cases.51 There are several reasons
behind this basic policy. A state's decision to classify conduct as criminal
indicates the importance it has ascribed to prompt and unimpaired enforce-
ment of its law, evidencing a strong state interest, whereas the state might
not even be a party in a civil proceeding, and therefore have less interest.5 2
tant and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful
conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its
laws and the Constitution.
Id. at 51-52.
44. 401 U.S. at 54.
45. Id. at 44. The Court stressed that the concept of "Our Federalism" does not
mean blind deference to states' rights, but rather represents a system in which there is
"sensitivity to the legitimate interests of State and National Governments, and in which
the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly inter-
fere with the legitimate activities of the States." Id.
46. Id. at 54 (Stewart, J., concurring).
47. Id. at .55. Mr. Justice Stewart explained, for example, that an offense to state
interests is likely to be less in a civil proceeding. Id. at 55 n.2.
48. 95 S. Ct. 1200, 43 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1975).
49. id. at 1203, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 486-87. Prior to this decision, various lower federal
courts had concluded for themselves that the application of general notions of comity,
equity, and federalism to a determination of whether federal courts should enjoin state
officers should not turn on such labels as "civil" or "criminal," but rather upon analysis
of the competing interests in each case. See, e.g., Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); Palaio v. McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir.
1972); Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1972); Phillips v. Osborne, 444 F.2d
778 (9th Cir. 1971); MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 365 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ala. 1973), prob.
juris. noted, 415 U.S. 975 (1974).
50. 95 S. Ct. at 1208-10, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 493-94.
51. See, e.g., note 33 supra and accompanying text. See also Comment, The Su-
preme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 201, 216-18 (1972), where the author, in
giving his predictions on the implications of Younger, said that considerations of comity
do not call for application of the Younger rule in the civil context because federal inter-
vention in state civil proceedings is less likely to sharpen federal-state tensions. "If that
rule were applied, much of the rigidity of section 2283 would be reintroduced, the signif-
icance of Mitchum for those seeking relief from state civil proceedings would largely
be destroyed, and the recognition of section 1983 as an exception to the Anti-Injunction
Statute would have been a Pyrrhic victory." Id. at 217-18.
52. 401 U.S. at 55 n.2.
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Furthermore, while federal relief through habeas corpus 58 is available to the
state court criminal defendant after exhaustion of state remedies, that option
is not available to the losing litigant in a state civil proceeding which does not
result in custodial detention. 54 In his dissenting opinion 5 in Huffman, Mr.
Justice Brennan noted that in contrast to the safeguards present in criminal
proceedings against spurious prosecutions such as arrest, charge, information
or indictment, the civil proceeding is begun by the mere filing of a complaint
by one party, without any of the equivalent safeguards. 58 The majority
opinion in Huffman adequately circumvented the first argument by applying
the new extension of the Younger rule only to those civil proceedings, such
as Huffman, which are in many respects similar to criminal prosecutions.
The Court, for example, emphasized the fact that the state was a party in the
lower state court proceeding, and that the state's civil nuisance abatement
statute upon which the case was based is both in aid of and closely related to
criminal statutes which carry out the same state policy of prohibiting the
dissemination of obscene materials."7 An infringement of the state's interest
by federal intervention in such a case is likely to be as great as it would be
were this a criminal proceeding.58 In dealing with the second argument
against the extension of the Younger rule, the majority in Huffman empha-
sized that Younger turned on considerations of comity and federalism and
that Huffman must likewise be controlled by application of those same
factors. 59 The Court stated that the issue of whether federal courts should be
able to intervene in state proceedings is distinct and separate from the issue
of whether litigants are entitled to subsequent federal review of state court
dispositions of federal questions.60 The majority did not deal with the third
aforementioned argument concerning the lack of safeguards against unfound-
ed civil proceedings.
The Huffman decision, as an extension of the toughened standards for
federal intervention in state court proceedings, is a further step in locating
the most harmonious balance between the protection of constitutional guar-
antees and principles of federalism and comity. A party in state court civil or
criminal proceedings may still be awarded federal injunctive or declaratory
relief in certain extraordinary circumstances where the state proceeding is
conducted in bad faith or with an intent to harrass, or where the challenged
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). Section 2254(a) provides: "The Supreme Court, a
Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States."
54. 95 S. Ct. at 1208-09, 43 L Ed. 2d at 493.
55. Id. at 1212, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1214, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 499.
57. Id. at 1208, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 492.
58. This argument was used in MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 365 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ala.
1973), prob. furs. noted, 415 U.S. 975 (1974), where the court dealt with consolidated
actions under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from
state court orders enjoining operation of theaters and book stores under nuisance stat-
utes. The three-judge district court held that on principles of equity, comity, and fed-
eralism, the actions would be dismissed in accordance with Younger, where state pro-
ceedings complemented or substituted for proceedings under criminal laws of the state.




statute is flagrantly and patently unconstitutional."1 Even when these excep-
tional factors are not present, a party wronged in a state court civil case,
though lacking the possibility of habeas corpus relief available to criminal
defendants,62 still has the option of invoking federal judicial process to
protect his constitutional rights after exhaustion of state remedies" or the
option, in certain circumstances, of removal to federal court before state
court proceedings begin.64 These methods create less friction in the opera-
tion of a dual system of government and lend more respect to state judicial
systems which, having concurrent power to decide controversies within
article III of the United States Constitution, 5 should be as fair and as
competent to decide such cases. Premature resort to federal court instead of
exhausting state court processes casts a direct aspersion on the competency of
state courts and hampers efficiency because of duplicative efforts of the two
court systems, disruption of the state proceeding through the issuance of
unnecessary stays, and the burdensome necessity for the parties to proceed in
two courts simultaneously.6 6
In the present case, Pursue argued that Younger did not apply, as there
was no pending action, the nuisance abatement action having already come
to completion, except for enforcement of an injunction against the operation
of a theater, and no appeal from that judgment having been taken within the
state system.6 7 The Court's conclusion was that a party in Pursue's position
must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the district
court unless he can bring himself within one of the exceptions specified in
Younger.68 The Court reasoned that federal intervention at the appellate
stage is likely to be even more disruptive and offensive than intervention at
or before trial because the state has already won a nisi prius determination
that its policies are being violated so as to justify judicial abatement.6 9 In
requiring exhaustion of state appellate remedies for the purposes of applying
Younger, the Court in Huffman distinguished Monroe v. Pape,70 which held
that a party seeking relief for deprivation of federal rights under section
61. 95 S. Ct. at 1200, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 482.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).63. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970). This provision, which applies in both civil and
criminal cases, specifies when the United States Supreme Court may review, by appeal
or by certiorari, a final judgment of the highest court of a state in which a decision
could be had. According to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1), appellee in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.
was assured of eventual consideration of its claim by the United States Supreme Court,for where a final decision of a state court has sustained the validity of a state statute
challenged on federal constitutional grounds, an appeal to the Supreme Court lies as a
matter of right.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
65. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
66. See Perez v. Ledesmo, 401 U.S. 82, 120-21 (1971).67. Brief for Appellee at 11, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 95 S. Ct. 1200, 43 L. Ed.
2d 482 (1975).
68. 95 S. Ct. at 1210, 43 L Ed. 2d at 494-95. According to the Younger doctrine,
these exceptions are when the state proceeding is conducted in bad faith or with an in-
tent to harrass, or when the challenged statute is flagrantly and patently unconstitu-
tional. See note 42 supra.
69. 95 S. Ct. at 1210, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 495.
70. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The complaint in this case was against a city police of-
ficer for an allegedly illegal search and seizure.
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1983 of the Civil Rights Act7' does not have to first initiate state proceed-
ings based on related state causes of action. Huffman, in contrast, was
concerned with a different issue, namely the deference to be accorded state
proceedings which have already been initiated and which offer a competent
forum for the determination of federal questions.72
III. CONCLUSION
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., in extending the strict Younger rule to certain
civil cases which are similar in critical aspects to criminal prosecutions, is
significant in that it further limits the instances where a federal court may
intervene in state judicial proceedings, while stressing the importance of
comity and federalism principles. Because of the Court's cautious limitation
of the Younger rule to such cases rather than holding it applicable to all civil
proceedings, the Huffman decision in a sense perpetuates the traditional
deference to be accorded the principle that courts of equity should show
greater reluctance to intervene in criminal prosecutions than in civil proceed-
ings. As a first step by the Supreme Court in facing the issue of Younger's
applicability in civil cases, however, the Hulfman case may have implica-
tions for further expansion of the rule to all civil proceedings.
Debra Ann Bacharach
Henderson v. Ford Motor Co.: Defense and Proof of Defect
Limits to Recovery In Product Liability Actions
Irene Henderson was driving her 1968 automobile in city traffic when she
discovered that she could not control the speed of her car. Realizing that she
was approaching a busy intersection, Mrs. Henderson drove her car into a
large light pole and was seriously injured. Both the manufacturer and
distributor of the automobile were sued in strict liability for defective
manufacture of a carburetor gasket. The jury found that the defective design
of the automobile's air filter was the producing cause of Mrs. Henderson's
damages and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The court of civil
appeals reversed and remanded,' stating that the issue of "contributory
negligence' 2 should have been submitted to the jury. Held, reversed: The
contributorily negligent conduct of the plaintiff after the discovery of a
products defect is not a defense in a strict liability action. Although the
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
72. 95 S. Ct. at 1211 n.21, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 495 n.21.
1. 500 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973).
2. In applying this defense to the plaintiff's behavior after the discovery of the
alleged defect, the court of civil appeals noted that the jury should consider whether the
plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known danger. Id. at 712.
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volenti non fit injuria defense can bar recovery, it is based on subjective
factors; the objective reasonableness of any voluntary encounter with a
known risk is not a concomitant of this defense. However, since the plaintiff
failed to introduce any evidence of defective design, recovery of damages
is denied. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
I. ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS
DEFENSES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
A. Background
Texas was a pioneer in recognizing the theory of liability without fault. In
Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps3 the supreme court ruled that a manufac-
turer or processor of food unfit for human consumption was strictly liable to
the consumer notwithstanding the absence of privity or negligence.
4
Subsequently, in two companion cases, 5 Texas formally adopted section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.6 Based on the policies of loss
prevention and justifiable consumer relianceJ the Texas Supreme Court
yielded to the logic that strict liability in tort is the only practicable vehicle
for the protection of the public from defective products. The court did point
out, however, that the rule is strict liability rather than absolute liability, and
the manufacturer is not an insurer of his product,8 thereby recognizing that
boundaries to the cause of action exist. There are two basic problems in
defining these limits to recovery: the available defenses and the requisite
burden of proof to establish the existence of a defect.9
The task of distinguishing between the defenses of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence has been difficult in Texas'0 due to the general
esoteric nature of the concepts" and the Texas courts' unique subclassifica-
3. 139 Tex. 609, 164S.W.2d 828 (1942).
4. Id. at 610, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
5. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Shamrock Fuel
& Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as RE-
STATEMENT] states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) the rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
7. See notes 42-45 infra and accompanying text.
8. Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Tex. 1967).
9. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30
(1973).
10. See, e.g., Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 150 Tex. 191, 238 S.W.2d 172
(1951). In assumption of risk, the duty owed by the defendant is extinguished, whereas
in contributory negligence the duty is still owed but the plaintiff's misconduct bars
recovery. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 417 (4th ed. 1971).
11. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 68, at 439.
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tion system.12 Three separate doctrines have developed: assumption of risk,
where the plaintiff voluntarily confronts a known risk based on a contractual
relation existing between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor;'8 volenti non fit
injuria, a doctrine similar to assumption of risk but applicable even where a
contractual relation does not exist;' 4 and contributory negligence, a defense
based on the plaintiff's failure to use ordinary care.' 5
Confusion between the doctrines of volenti and contributory negligence
has been particularly prevalent. 16 In Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc.17
the Texas Supreme Court limited the scope of volenti due to its harsh
restrictions on recovery' 8 and distinguished it from contributory negligence
on two grounds: justification and proximate cause.' 9 When only contributory
negligence is at issue a plaintiff may voluntarily expose himself to a known
risk and not be barred from recovery if such conduct was reasonably justified
under the circumstances.2 0 Also, for contributory negligence to be a valid
defense, the plaintiff's negligence must have been a proximate cause of his
own harm. 2' In contrast, the volenti defense exists without inquiry as to
proximate cause or the plaintiff's justification.2 2 In relating these two
12. See notes 13-15, 19 infra and accompanying text.
13. Generally, the doctrine of assumption of risk has been limited to cases involving
a master-servant relationship. Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 150 Tex. 191, 238
S.W.2d 172 (1951). But the court has pointed out that assumption of risk can be used in
a nontechnical sense in other cases, if the doctrine is used to designate a person's actions
rather than a particular doctrine. Scott v. Liebman, 404 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1966)
(occupier-invitee case).
14. Volenti non fit injuria, literally meaning that that to which a person assents is
not deemed in law an injury, is also referred to as incurred risk. The court has ruled that
in order for this defense to be valid in negligence cases, the plaintiff's free and intelligent
decision to incur the risk must be made with actual knowledge and actual appreciation of
the danger. Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 150 Tex. 191, 238 S.W.2d 172 (1951). In
certain situations the danger might be so open and obvious that the requisite appreciation
of the danger is imputed to the plaintiff. Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607(1952). As a result of this rationale, the question became whether the plaintiff knew or
should have known and appreciated the danger. McKee v. Peterson, 153 Tex. 517, 271
S.W.2d 391 (1954). As such, a type of objective contributory negligence standard,
involving due care, has been superimposed to some extent on the supposedly distinct
defense of volenti.
15. See, e.g., McFall v. Fletcher, 138 Tex. 93, 157 S.W.2d 1-31 (1941).-
16. Chief Justice Greenhill of the Texas Supreme Court has pointed out that the
confusion surrounding assumption of risk in Texas also stems from the fact that there is
not a logical sequence in the cases applying the doctrine. He has stated that because of
this confusion the court was at one time tempted to abolish the doctrine altogether.
Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 111 (1964).
17. 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
18. Id. at 380. Perhaps motivated by the harshness of this doctrine and Texas' recent
adoption of comparative negligence, TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. Ar. art. 2212a, § 1 (Supp.
1975), the court recently held that volenti was no longer a defense to actions predicated
upon negligence. The reasonableness of an actor's conduct in confronting a risk will now
be determined under the principles of contributory negligence. It was pointed out,
however, that volenti will still apply in cases involving an expressly assumed risk as well
as strict liability. See also Farley v. M&M Cattle Co. 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 398, 403 (July
9, 1975); Rosas v. Buddies Foods, Inc., 518 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Tex. 1975).
19. 371 S.W.2d at 379. The court also distinguished the concept of "no duty" from
volenti based on the type of action involved and the element of justification, but noted
the defenses' basic similarities. Id. at 380. However, by pointing out that "no duty" only
applied to invitee cases, the court severely limited the applicability of the reasonable man
standard in volenti cases. Id. at 378.
20. See Keeton, Assumption of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965); 371 S.W.2d
at 379.
21. 371 S.W.2d at 379.
22. Id. at 380.
defenses to strict liability cases, 28 the Texas courts have been concerned with
these distinctions based on the conduct of the plaintiff and the applicability
of each defense in an action not based on the concepts of negligence or
fault.24
The Texas Supreme Court has not only accepted the section 402A theory
of strict liability, but has also limited the defenses applicable to this type of
action in accord with the Restatement. In Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co.
v. Tunks25 the court held that a minor plaintiff who was contributorily
negligent in pouring kerosene over a smoldering stick could still recover.
Further, in ,McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc.26 a beauty operator who
should have known the danger of using a permanent wave treatment on
bleached hair was allowed to recover in spite of her lack of due care.27 Rely-
ing on the principles enunciated in comment n of section 402A,28 the supreme
court held that a plaintiff should not be barred from recovery by reason of
his failure to test the product for possible defects. 29 Although removing the
defense of contributory negligence with respect to the plaintiff's conduct prior
to the discovery of the defect, the court seemed to indicate that only
assumption of risk or volenti would bar recovery in products liability
actions.80 Since products liability rests on the assumption that the consumer
justifiably relied on the integrity of the manufacturer and vendor of the
products, recovery should not be limited to the reasonably prudent buyer. On
the other hand, if there was a subjective realization of the danger, reliance
on the manufacturer's representations of fitness and merchantability was not
justifiable. 31 However, volenti was not clearly defined and its role in
product liability cases was not expressly decided. Similarly, the court left
open the question of whether the plaintiff's contributorily negligent conduct
occurring after discovery of the defect would be recognized as a defense.
The Fifth Circuit has also struggled with the volenti issue in two products
liability cases, Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.82 and Messick v.
General Motors Corp.s8 According to the Restatement formulation of
23. Of course, other possible defenses exist to products -liability cases including
misuse, adequacy of warning or instructions, and unavoidably unsafe product. See
RESTATEMENT § 402A, comments h, j, & k. See also Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v.
Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, writ dism'd) (applying the
misuse doctrine as a defense and equating it with volenti rather than contributory
negligence). See generally Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory
Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAmn. L. REv. 93, 95 (1972).
24. See note 52 infra and accompanying text.
25. 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
26. 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
27. Id. at 793. In both these cases, the court equated this conduct with contributory
negligence rather than misuse, thereby possibly limiting the application of the misuse
defense to unintended and unforeseeable use.
28. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment n, states: "Contributory negligence of the
plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover
the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence." The
majority of jurisdictions have adopted this view. See, e.g., O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103
Ariz. 556, 477 P.2d 248 (1968); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 262 N.E.2d
305 (1970). Contra, Mairorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965).
29. Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 786 (Tex. 1967).
30. Id. at 785.
31. Id. at 786.
32. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
33. 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972).
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volenti or assumption of risk, the question was not only whether the
plaintiff voluntarily incurred the risk but also whether this conduct was
objectively reasonable.3 4 Since the Texas Supreme Court had already ac-
cepted comment n as it related to contributory negligence, the federal court
reasoned that the hybridization of the volenti defense enunciated in this
comment had been thereby impliedly accepted by the Texas court.35
B. Henderson v. Ford Motor 'Co.
The supreme court in Henderson v. Ford Motor Co. 36 restated the
general rule as to volenti in Texas, disregarding the Restatement's defini-
tion of defense. 37 The court felt that the somewhat harsh Texas doctrine
had validity in strict liability actions; 38 thus, plaintiffs who voluntarily
encounter a known product danger or risk, even if such conduct was
reasonable, should not recover.3 9 However, the court determined that Mrs.
Henderson's failure to discover the best possible means of escape was not
volenti.40
By barring the plaintiff who voluntarily confronts a known product risk
without inquiry as to reasonableness, the goal of risk distribution is not
promoted. 41 Indeed, the Texas cases turn on other grounds, including
whether the imposition of liability will prevent future occurrences of the
same type42 and whether the consumer justifiably relied on the manufactur-
er's reputation and representations as to the quality of the product. 43 The
34. The Fifth Circuit recognized that in order for volenti to exist under Halepeska,
four conditions must be met: (1) the plaintiff must have knowledge of facts constituting
a dangerous condition; (2) he must know the condition or activity to be dangerous; (3)
he must appreciate the nature or extent of the danger; and (4) he must voluntarily
expose himself to this danger. 460 F.2d at 488. Although the Fifth Circuit was cognizant
of the subjective standard applied by the Texas courts with respect to volenti, the federal
court believed that the defense was modified as it applied to strict tort liability cases due
to the Texas adoption of RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment n. As such, the court
reasoned, an objective standard of reasonableness must be included within the fourth
element of volenti. That is, the plaintiff must voluntarily and unreasonably expose
himself to the danger. The Beaumont court of civil appeals in Henderson v. Ford Motor
Co., 500 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973), also interpreted the Texas
Supreme Court rulings in this manner. Other state courts have adopted this doctrine as
well. See, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alas. 1970); Ferraro v. Ford Motor
Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 454
P.2d 205 (1969).
35. 493 F.2d at 1096; 460 F.2d at 491. Comment n states: "On the other hand the
form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceed-
ing to encounter a known danger. . . is a defense under this Section." RESTATEMENT §
402A, comment n (emphasis added).
36. 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
37. Id. at 90; see notes 14, 35 supra and accompanying text.
38. 519 S.W.2d at 90.
39. Id. at 91.
40. Id. at 92.
41. The risk distribution policy is the theory that a supplier should be held liable
because he can absorb the loss as a cost of doing business, which is then passed on to the
general public through higher priced consumer goods. By this means society as a whole
pays for the cost of losses suffered by those injured. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63
Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (Traynor, J., concurring).
42. The Texas policy of prevention has been set forth in various cases. See Darryl v.
Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks,
416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164
S.W.2d 828 (1942). Only one civil appeals case has approved the risk distribution policy.
Thermal Supply Inc. v. Asel, 468 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, no writ).
43. See, e.g., Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 612, 164 S.W.2d 828,
831 (1942).
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Texas courts have gradually extended manufacturers' liability for product
defects, in order to protect the defenseless consumer, by basing the action on
strict tort liability.44 The tendency has been, however, to guard against
absolute liability through the implementation of these accepted policy goals
which, consequently, become the theoretical basis for defining the boundaries
to the action. 45 Prevention of loss by imposition of strict liability is question-
able when there is a subjective realization of the defect by the plaintiff.
Thus, the courts reason, if the consumer knows of the defect and still
continues to use the product, the manufacturer should not be held liable for
his representations. If the consumer knows, appreciates and understands the
danger involved in using the product after discovering a defect, he is not
justified in relying on the manufacturers' advertising, trade name, or implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness. In such a case, the goal of loss
prevention is not furthered and the basic premise of the action is not met.
The Henderson court not only recognized the Texas rule that the plain-
tiff's lack of due care in failing to discover a defect would not bar
recovery, 40 but also pointed out that contributory negligence after the
discovery of the defect would not preclude recovery.47 The supreme court
based this decision on the precedent set forth in Marshall v. Ranne,48 a strict
liability case which involved injuries sustained in a confrontation with a
trespassing vicious hog. In Marshall, the court stated that because the action
for damages caused by dangerous trespassing animals was based on strict
liability and not negligence, contributory negligence could not be a de-
fense. 49 The plaintiff was still allowed to recover for the damages he
sustained, even though the jury found that the plaintiff's negligent failure to
shoot the offending hog was a proximate cause of his injuries. 50 The court
ruled that a failure to choose the right alternative after discovering the risk
was not a bar to recovery even though it may be contributory negligence.5 '
Under the Henderson court's approach, the policies of loss prevention and
protection of consumers who justifiably rely on products were attained. The
manufacturer's conduct which led to the presence of the defect would be
deterred, and the manufacturer would realize that the only way to prevent
44. See notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text.
45. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
46. 519 S.W.2d at 89.
47. Id. at 90.
48. 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974).
49. Id. at 259.
50. Id. at 257.
51. The court in Marshall also confronted the question of assumption of risk as it
related to this question. The plaintiff knew of the vicious nature of the hog prior to the
incident and confronted the animal when it came upon his property. Thus, the defendant
claimed that the plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to the danger. The court held that
there was no voluntary encounter since there was not a 'free choice of alternatives
available-the plaintiff's only choices were to face the danger or surrender his rights in
regard to the property. Id. at 260. Similarly the defendant in Henderson argued that the
plaintiff by intentionally running into the light pole and by not choosing the best means
of escape voluntarily confronted the danger. However, the court stressed the point that if
the defendant has placed the plaintiff in a dilemma by leaving him no reasonable
alternative to encountering the danger, the encounter is not voluntary.
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future judgments of this type would be to alter his mode of production. At
the same time, the consumer, although careless, still relied on the manufac-
turer's integrity and did not subjectively believe that this reliance was
unfounded.
Within the context of Henderson, the court has firmly established the idea
that strict liability, whether involving defective products or trespassing
animals, is not based upon negligence. Arguably, however, the unexpressed
analysis used by the court in determining the type of conduct which would
bar recovery was based on the relative fault of each party to the action. 52
The court may have been merely balancing the relative degrees of negli-
gence-the manufacturer's conduct by creating the incident was more culpa-
ble than was the plaintiff's later negligent action when forced to react to the
situation after discovery of the defect. The same principle applies to the
plaintiff's negligent conduct in failing to inspect the product before use.
Justifiable reliance, the basis of the products liability action, although
theoretically arising out of basic warranty concepts, is thus a mechanism
through which basic negligence factors are considered by the court, even in a
strict liability case.
II. PROOF OF DEFECT
In setting guidelines and boundaries for the application of the traditional
negligence defenses to product defect cases, the courts have been concerned
with the questions of where or why liability should stop and what circum-
stances wilt excuse a manufacturer or distributor from liability. These
questions, involving basic policy considerations, have also had a considerable
influence on the courts' treatment of proof of defective condition, another
issue fundamental to the development of the law of products liability. In
accepting the idea that strict liability does not equal absolute liability, the
courts have held that the plaintiff in a product defect case must prove more
than mere injury in order to recover. 53 Although this principle is clear,
questions arise with respect to the nature and extent of the facts the plaintiff
must prove and the techniques which can be utilized in meeting this burden.5 4
A. Requirements of Proof
The Texas courts, having adopted the Restatement principles of products
liability,55 require that the plaintiff must prove (1) that a defective condi-
52. This fact does not coincide with the basis of the action in strict tort liability. See
notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text.
53. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 853 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Franks v. National Dairy Prods., 282 F. Supp. 528 (W.D.
Tex. 1968).
54. See Reingold, Proof of Defect in Products Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REv. 325
(1970).
55. Garcia v. Sky Climber, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1970, no writ). The products liability principle promulgated by the Restate-
ment on proof of defect is also used by the Fifth Circuit in applying Texas laws. See,
e.g., Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 502 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1968).
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tion existed when possession or control of the product was relinquished by
the defendant,5 6 and (2) that the product was unreasonably dangerous. 57
These requirements may be proven directly by means of expert testimony. 8
However, due to the difficulty of procuring direct evidence of a defect, the
plaintiff may also rely on circumstantial evidence.59 Since the courts often
caution against jury speculation about the presence or absence of a causative
defect, 60 a circumstantial basis often leads to evidentiary problems. In negli-
gence cases, juries are often allowed to infer liability under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.61 In recent cases, though, courts have cautioned against its
use,0 2 since reliance on res ipsa is questionable in products cases.63 Yet, cir-
cumstantial evidence is still successfully utilized to prove defective condi-
tion.0 4
Certain established facts properly lead to an inference of defective
condition occurring as the result of a deficient manufacturing process.65 The
fact that the incident happened in the first place is some proof. 66 If the
product is relatively new the inference is more justifiable. 7 In addition, the
courts have been more willing to allow the inference to be drawn if the
56. Jack Roach-Bissonnett, Inc. v. Puskar, 417 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1967).
57. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment i, stating: "The article sold must be dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its character-
istics." California has rejected the idea that the plaintiff must prove that the defect made
the product unreasonably dangerous. The court held that the elimination of this require-
ment provided a clear and simple test for determining whether the plaintiff should
recover. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972). Other authors suggest that this unreasonably dangerous element of proof is
merely part of the meaning of defect and thus separate elements of proof should not be
required even under the Restatement formulation. See Keeton, supra note 9. One author
has suggested that the Texas courts have not clearly delineated the parameters of
unreasonably dangerous. See Sales, Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 11 Hous. L. REv. 1043
(1974).
58. Williams v. General Motors Corp., 501 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
59. Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
60. See, e.g., Soso v. Atlas Powder Co., 238 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1956).
61. Under this doctrine, negligence can be inferred from the mere fact that the
accident happened if the item or instrumentality causing the damage was in the exclusive
control of the defendant and the type of accident was one which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of negligence. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §
39, at 211 (4th ed. 1971). For a discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa and the proper
submission of special issues on res ipsa to the jury, see Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517
S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974). See generally Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Texas, 26 TEXAS L.
REv. 257 (1948).
62. See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967).
63. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is generally not applicable in products cases
because at the time of an accident occurring while the product is in use the defendant
does not have exclusive control of the defective product. Keeton, Products Liability-
Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26, 36 (1965).
64. See Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.
1969); Bell Aerospace Corp. v. Anderson, 478 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hobart, 423 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. See Keeton, Products Liability-Problems Pertaining To Proof of Negligence, 19
Sw. L.J. 26 (1965).
66. In some cases, if the plaintiff testifies to this fact alone, the requirement of proof
has been met. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69,
97-98 (1960).




product comes in a sealed container which has not been opened or tampered
with.68
Texas courts have recognized that a plaintiff may recover for a design
defect as well as a defective condition resulting from a manufacturing error
or omission.69 The plaintiff must still prove that a defective design existed
which rendered the product unreasonably dangerous and can still utilize
direct and circumstantial evidence. But due to the nature of a design defect,
the plaintiff is forced to rely heavily on technical expert testimony. In
testifying, the experts must identify the design flaw or flaws that occasioned
the injury, enumerate alternative design features proposed to reduce the
danger, evaluate these features relative to the expected performance stan-
dards of the product as well as their effect upon the product's subsequent
usefulness and cost, compare the possibly defective product with other
similar products and establish the causal link between the design deficiency
and the injury. 70 In order for the plaintiff to recover, the jury must not only
make the appropriate inferences from this testimony, but as with other
expert witnesses, the witness must also be considered credible. The allowable
inferences in both manufacturing and design defect cases are, of course,
subject to the "no evidence" or "scintilla of evidence" rules. 7"
B. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co.
In Henderson the court found that the plaintiff had failed to produce any
evidence that a design defect existed. 72 As noted by the dissent, the majority
concluded that on the basis of the evidence presented no reasonable man
could find that a design defect existed in spite of the fact that a jury of
twelve and four dissenting justices reached this conclusion. 73 There was
witness testimony to support the required inference. Witnesses at trial
testified as to the defective and questionable design of the carburetor and -the
68. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964). The Texas Supreme Court has applied this "sealed container" principle to
automobiles but only to prove that the defect existed at the time of sale. McKisson v.
Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
69. See, e.g., Olson v. Royal Metals Corp., 392 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1968); Garcia v.
Sky Climber, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970,
no writ); Texas Bitulithic Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 357 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (suit based on negligence theory).
70. Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products
Liability Litigation, 52 TEXAs L. Rav. 1303, 1310 (1974).
71. Generally, in an instance such as this, the court must consider only that evidence
most favorable to the party seeking to prove a fact or condition, disregarding entirely
that which is opposed or contradictory in nature. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex.
507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950). It must draw all inferences which support the findings,
rejecting the evidence and inferences which are contrary to the trial court's findings.
Butler v. Hanson, 455 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1970). It is not within the appellate court's
jurisdiction to weigh the evidence and to determine what happened; to overturn a jury's
finding, the evidence must conclusively prove the opposite point as a matter of law.
Langlotz v. Citizens Fid. Ins. Co., 505 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1974). See Martinez v. Delta
Brands, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1974), in which Chief Justice Greenhill suggested
that evidence which creates a mere surmise or suspicion is no evidence. See also Calvert,
"No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TExAs L. REv. 361
(1960).
72. 519 S.W.2d at 93.
73. Id. at 95 n.2 (dissenting opinion).
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alternative design used in the newer model of the same vehicle. 74 In
addition, there was some circumstantial evidence in the record to support the
plaintiff's claim.7 5 Thus, as there was some evidence to support the jury's
finding that a design defect existed, the supreme court's overturning of the
jury's verdict is indeed questionable under the Texas sufficiency of evidence
rules.76
This decision clearly affects the practicing Texas attorney who attempts to
prove design defect. The amount of evidence necessary to prove a design
defect or to support a jury's finding that a design defect existed is rendered
uncertain by the court's opinion. Most importantly, though, the decision that
no design defect was present demonstrates a boundary to products liability
recovery set by the Texas court, which can be utilized by courts to limit
actions by consumers. If the Texas courts in the future require more
evidence and less "speculation" for liability in product defect cases, it is clear
that there will be narrower boundaries to the action and thus fewer
consumers will recover.
III. CONCLUSION
The development of strict tort liability for product defects was founded on
public policy precepts influenced by a consumer-based orientation of the
courts. The Texas courts have recognized that because the action is based on
strict tort liability the injured consumer should not be hampered by the
affirmative defense of contributory negligence, whether the plaintiff's lack of
due care occurred before or after discovery of the defect. At the same time,
the Texas courts have not been concerned with the possible total protection
of the defenseless consumer. No court has ever stated that absolute liability
should be the rule. Even the Restatement formulation of products liability
requires certain elements of proof and allows for certain defenses.
However, the Texas courts, in cautioning against a manufacturer or
distributor becoming an insurer of his product, have gone too far in limiting
the scope and nature of the action. When the policy expressed by a court is
risk distribution or merely compensation of those injured, more consumers
are allowed to recover, even though certain limits to the action still exist.
With the acceptance of a loss-prevention policy, the Texas courts have set
narrower boundaries to products liability actions. As such, they have failed
to adopt the Restatement's more liberal definition of the assumption of risk
defense and instead have applied the harsher Texas doctrine of volenti. At
the same time, although not expressing the loss-prevention policy, the Texas
courts have expanded the measure of proof required to show a design defect.
It is unfortunate that a state which was once considered a pioneer in the
products liability field would limit recovery in this manner.
If the fundamental basis of the action is consumer protection, then the risk
74. Id. at 96-99 (dissenting opinion).
75. Mrs. Henderson's vehicle was purchased a mere seven months prior to the
incident and only had 9,000 miles on it. Id. at 88. See notes 65-68 supra and
accompanying text.
76. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
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distribution or compensation policies more adequately promote this goal as
does a more liberal evaluation of the proof requirements. Thus, the narrower
boundaries created by the Texas courts in implementing the policy goals of
loss prevention and justifiable reliance do not coincide with the basis of the
action in strict tort liability and the ultimate goal of consumer protection.
The result has been the development of a rather unique type of action in
Texas; one which is hampered by policy considerations not reflecting societal
needs.
Janice Vyn
Maness v. Myers: Attorney's Contempt for Advising the Fifth
Petitioner, an attorney, appeared as counsel for Michael McKelva in a
civil injunction proceeding. The city of Temple,Texas, sought to enjoin the
sale of certain allegedly obscene magazines at the store which McKelva
operated.' McKelva was served with a subpoena duces tecum ordering him
to appear in court with some fifty-two named magazines. McKelva twice
declined to produce the magazines, claiming that they might be obscene and
that their production would tend to incriminate him.2 Both times McKelva
stated that his refusal was based upon the advice of counsel, and, but for such
advice, he would have produced the subpoenaed magazines. The trial judge
found McKelva guilty of contempt for failure to obey an order to produce
and also found petitioner guilty of contempt for advising McKelva to
disobey.3 After all habeas corpus possibilities in Texas had been exhausted, 4
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed: An
attorney, acting in good faith, cannot be held in contempt for advising his
1. The injunction was sought under repealed TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 527, §
13 (1971). Generally, the article set forth criminal penalties for specific acts of distri-
bution of obscene articles. Section 13, however, provided for an injunction to enforce
its provisions. The entire article was repealed by ch. 399, § 3(a), [1973] Tex. Laws
991, effective January 1, 1974. The new law has no provisions equivalent to section 13.
2. McKelva had been convicted six days earlier under a Temple city ordinance for
selling obscene magazines. Petitioner admitted that the subpoenaed magazines dealt ex-
plicitly with acts of a sexual nature, and that they were of the same character as the
magazines for which McKelva previously had been convicted and, therefore, there existed
a substantial possibility of self-incrimination if McKelva were required to produce the
magazines.
3. The trial judge based his decision on the grounds that the fifth amendment plea
was not available in a civil proceeding and that a motion to suppress in any subsequent
criminal proceeding would afford adequate protection against any self-incriminating evi-
dence obtained by way of the coercive court order.
Pursuant to Texas law, TEx. REv. Gv. STAT. ANN. art. 1911a, § 2(c) (1960), the
contempt against the petitioner, because he was an attorney, was reviewed by another
district judge who affirmed the initial contempt judgment and set a $500 fine.
4. Under Texas law "there is no right 'to an appeal from an order of contempt.
The only remedy to review such an order is by writ of habeas corpus, when relator is
in custody." Arnold v. State, 493 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (emphasis
added). Thus, since petitioner was only fined and was not "in custody," the judgment
was a final judgment to which the Court's certiorari extends. Judiciary and Judicial Pro-
cedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1970). Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480 (1965).
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client to risk a contempt charge5 by asserting the fifth amendment privilege
in order to avert the production of subpoenaed material when there is no
other avenue to assure appellate review without having to surrender such
material. Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
I. DISOBEDIENCE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Ordinarily, disobedience to an unconstitutional or otherwise invalid judi-
cial order may result in criminal contempt.6 In United States v. United Mine
Workers7 the United States Supreme Court stated that orderly and expedi-
tious administration of justice by the courts requires that an order issued by a
court with proper jurisdiction must be obeyed until it is reversed by proper
proceedings." However, this doctrine is by no means absolute. In situations
in which compliance with a judicial order would irreparably jeopardize an
irretrievable constitutional right because of the unavailability of pre-compli-
ance review, the doctrine is inapplicable.9 A fortiori, a refusal to comply
with a judicial order to provide potentially self-incriminating testimonial or
documentary evidence after a fifth amendment plea has been entered is a
classic exception to the doctrine espoused in United Mine Workers. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that the person to whom such an order
is directed has an alternative to involuntary compliance under the United
Mine Workers doctrine' 0 where the fifth amendment privilege is impaired,
since a witness who has involuntarily disclosed privileged information cannot
thereafter retrieve it," and since subsequent appellate review cannot ordi-
narily repair the error.1 2
5. The risk of contempt in this sense falls only on the client. If he chooses to
avert production under a fifth amendment plea he faces the possibility of a final adju-
dication of contempt if his claim is rejected on the appeal of the initial contempt cita-
tion. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1971); Cobblediok v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940).
The attorney's risk of contempt in giving advice to a client lies in the determination
of his good faith in giving such advice. See In re Watts & Sachs, 190 U.S. 1, 29 (1903).
See also note 20 infra.
6. Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922).
7. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
8. Id. at 293.
9. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963). The Court summarily re-
versed a contempt conviction that resulted when a black man disregarded a judge's order
to be seated in a section of the courtroom reserved for Negroes. A similar result fol-
lowed in Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964), rev'g 275 Ala. 574, 156 So. 2d
926 (1963), where the contempt resulted from a black woman's refusal to testify during
a criminal trial until the prosecutor accorded her the same courtesy he had previously
shown to white witnesses by addressing her as "Miss Hamilton" rather than "Mary."
See also Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
10. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S.
121 (1962); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); Alexander v. United
States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906).
11. "[O]nce the witness has complied with an order to testify, he cannot thereafter
retrieve the information involuntarily revealed, even if it subsequently develops that com-
pelling the testimony violated constitutional rights. In such a predicament, the damage
is irreparable. No remedies are available which can effectively cure the constitutional
deprivation after the order has been unwillingly obeyed." United States v. Dickinson,
465 F.2d 496, 512 (5th Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted).
12. Id.
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In United States v. Ryan'3 the Court set out two alternatives available to
one who reasonably believes in good faith that he is privileged from
producing ordered evidence. The witness or party subject to the order may
comply with the order to produce magazines or documents and still object to
the introduction of the subpoenaed material or its fruits against him at a
criminal trial. 14 Or he may refuse to comply and contest the validity of the
subpoena if he is subsequently cited for contempt on account of his failure to
obey 15 with the concomitant possibility of a final adjudication of contempt if
his claims are rejected on appeal. 16 When a witness chooses noncompliance,
relying on his fifth amendment privilege, he cannot be required to demon-
strate his entitlement to the privilege, for this would be exactly the type of
self-incriminating disclosure which the fifth amendment is designed to pre-
vent. 17 More than a century ago in United States v. Burr,'1 and more
recently in Hoffman v. United States,' 9 the Court set forth the general rule
that once a witness has stated that his answer is self-incriminating, a court
can demand no other testimony of the fact. The other alternative, compli-
ance coupled with a motion to suppress at a subsequent criminal proceeding,
is simply the exclusionary rule which forbids the use of illegally obtained
evidence. 20 But this after-the-fact protection, as compared with pre-compli-
ance review in a contempt hearing, is not absolute, since a state court in a
subsequent trial could conclude that the compulsory disclosure was not with-
in the fifth amendment privilege and thus allow the evidence to be used.
13. 402 U.S. 532 (1971). Ryan sought relief from an unappealable interlocutory
order directing him to comply with what he contended was an illegal subpoena duces
tecum, arguing that substantial burdens associated with compliance justified immediate
review of the order. The Court rejected the claim in ,the following terms:
Of course, if [Ryan] complies with the subpoena, he will not thereafter be
able to undo the substantial effort he has exerted in order to comply. But
compliance is not the only course open to [him]. If, as he claims, the
subpoena is unduly burdensome or otherwise unlawful, he may refuse to
comply and litigate those questions in the event that contempt or similar
proceedings are brought against him .... [The law provides] a choice
between compliance with a trial court's order to produce prior to any re-
view of that order, and resistance to that order with the concomitant pos-
sibility of an adjudication of contempt if [the] claims are rejected on appeal.
Id. at 532-33 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
14. Id. at 532 n.3, citing United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966).
15. 402 U.S. at 531-32, citing Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940).
16. 402 U.S. at 532, citing Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); Alex-
ander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906); cf. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251(1966); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962); Carroll v. United States, 354
U.S. 394 (1957).
17. "[I]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard[of self-incrimination] in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established
in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is
designed to guarantee." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
18. 25 F. Cas. 38 (No. 14,692e) (C.C. Va. 1807).
19. 341 U.S. 479 (1951); see note 17 supra and accompanying text.
20. This alternative can be used even if the fifth amendment privilege has not been
raised. See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966). In Blue the Court held
that even if the Government had acquired incriminating evidence (before the trial) in
violation of the witness's fifth amendment privilege he would at most be entitled to sup-
press evidence and its fruits if they were used against him at a criminal trial.
The Court has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been
obtained in violation of an -accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or
federal rules of civil procedure. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Rogers v.
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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These alternatives set out in Ryan are only available to a witness or party
and are normally decided upon through the advice of counsel. But the risk of
contempt in choosing not to comply is undertaken by the witness or party,
not by his attorney. As pointed out in In re Watts & Sachs, 21 it is the good
faith of the attorney in giving the advice to his client and not whether he
erred in judgment that determines whether the attorney may be held in
contempt. It is conceivable that an attorney, as well as his client, could be
held in contempt in a situation where the fifth amendment privilege was
being used merely to obstruct justice. For example, if a witness at the
instigation of his attorney continues to rely on the privilege following a valid
grant of use and derivative use immunity, 22 then a trial judge might be
justified in concluding that such resistance to his authority amounted to
criminal contempt. 23 But in this type of situation, like any other criminal
contempt involving an attorney, it is the attorney's good faith that is at issue
and not whether he erred in judgment. 24
II. MANESS V. MYERS
In Maness v. Myers25 the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
petitioner's contempt conviction. 20 The Court stated that compliance by
McKelva could have caused irreparable injury because appellate courts
cannot always "unring the bell" once the information has been released, 27
and therefore the noncompliance procedure described in Ryan was a
reasonable method for obtaining pre-compliance review. 28 The Court reject-
ed the respondent's argument that if petitioner's client had produced the
magazines he would have been amply protected because in any subsequent
criminal proceeding he could move to suppress, or object on fifth amendment
grounds to the introduction of the magazines into evidence. Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Court, stated that "without something more" 29
21. 190 U.S. 1 (1903). Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the Court, said:
In the ordinary case of advice to clients, if an attorney acts in good faith
and in the honest belief that his advice is well founded and in the just in-
terests of his client, he cannot be held liable for error in judgment. The
preservation of the independence of the bar is too vital to the due admin-
istration of justice to allow the application of any other general rule.
Id. at 29.
22. For a review of use and derivative use immunity see Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70 (1973); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967).
23. In the instant case neither the judge nor the city attorney offered any grant of
immunity to McKelva.
24. An attorney must know his action is wrongful and nevertheless do the act be-
fore he can be judged in criminal contempt. A good faith pursuit of a reasonable though
mistaken alternative is antithetical to contumacious intent in the context of criminal con-
tempt. In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
25. 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
26. Two concurring opinions were written; one by Justice Stewart joined by Justice
Blackman and the other by Justice White.
27. 419 U.S. at 460.
28. Id.; see note 13 supra and accompanying text. Of course, the alternative of
noncompliance as set out in Ryan was the exact alternative that petitioner advised his
client to take.
29. 419 U.S. at 462 n.10. The Court noted here that if McKelva had been granted
formal immunity a different case would be presented for then -the petitioner's good faith
would be open to doubt if he had advised his client to disobey in the face of a grant
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McKelva would have been forced to surrender the very protection which the
privilege is designed to guarantee.30
The Court distinguished the situation in Maness from that in United States
v. Blues' because in Blue the Government had already acquired the
information from the witness who had not even asserted his fifth amendment
privilege.8 2 In Maness the witness had not yet "let the cat out of the bag"
and had vigorously asserted his privilege 8 Answering the respondent's
contention that the privilege was not available in a civil proceeding the Court
reaffirmed the established principle that the privilege can be asserted in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory. 84
The Court seemed primarily concerned with the possible chilling effect a
threat of contempt might have upon an attorney's willingness to give honest
advice concerning his client's fifth amendment privilege. The Court stated
that the privilege would be drained of its meaning if counsel could be
penalized for advising his client in good faith to assert it.85 Since a layman
may not be aware of the precise scope, nuances and boundaries of his fifth
amendment privilege, he is entitled to the good faith advice of his counsel
concerning the privilege.86 If performance of a lawyer's duty to advise a
client about the availability of the privilege exposes a lawyer to the threat of
contempt for giving honest advice, it is highly conceivable that some
advocates might lose their zeal for forthrightness and independence.8 7 The
Court then restated the good faith test of In re Watts,88 and held that
lawyers are not subject to the penalty of contempt for good faith advice to
their clients to assert the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
in any proceeding embracing the power to compel testimony. Any other
holding would deny the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
the means of its own implementation.8 9
Though Maness was unprecedented in Anglo-American law, the Court did
not expand the law surrounding the fifth amendment privilege or that
concerned with the advice of counsel and its possible liabilities. In Maness
the Court reaffirmed established principles set out in Ryan,40 Kastigar,41
of immunity, citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Justice White's
concurring opinion goes beyond the majority opinion on this point. Justice White stated
that if a state clearly recognized the functional equivalent to a formal grant of immunity
as declared in Kastigar, Lelkowitz, and Garrity then an attorney would have no business
advising his client to disobey the court's order to answer. See note 22 supra.
30. 419 U.S. at 462, citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
31. 384 U.S. 251 (1966); see note 20 supra and accompanying text.
32. 419 U.S. at 462-63.
33. Id.
34. 419 U.S. at 464, citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378
U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J., concurring); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40
(1924).
35. 419 U.S. at 465.
36. Id. at 466.
37. Id.
38. See notes 5 and 21 supra and accompanying text.
39. 419 U.S. at 468. Respondent made no contention as to laok of petitioner's good
faith or reasonable grounds for assertion of a fifth amendment claim.
40. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
41. See notes 22 and 34 supra and accompanying text.
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and In re Watts.42
The respondent, probably realizing that the weight of authority was
against his assertions that the privilege was unavailable in a civil proceeding
and that a motion to suppress in a subsequent criminal proceeding would
afford ample protection, contended that the Court should uphold the con-
tempt conviction and allow the trial court to make some inquiry into an
assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination such as an in camera in-
spection. 48 The Court did not mention this in its opinion. Such a proposal,
by no means novel, 44 would in effect wipe out over a century of constitutional
litigation under the fifth amendment beginning with United States v. Burr45
and culminating in Hoffman v. United States.4 e
Respondent's proposal would, of course, make it easier for a trial judge to
rule on a fifth amendment claim and, therefore, expedite the judicial process.
But it would also have the effect of virtually nullifying the fifth amendment
guarantee, since all individuals asserting the privilege would have to waive it
on a demand for inspection by a judge. The Court has never before
subjected the privilege to such pragmatic considerations. 47 Unlike other
claims of privilege or questions of admissibility of evidence, a trial judge
must make a ruling on the privilege against self-incrimination with little
illumination as to the validity or efficacy of the claim. In Hoffman the Court
laid out its test48 for determining the validity of a claim of privilege against
self-incrimination, stating that the privilege must be recognized when there is
a mere possibility of danger and cannot be overruled unless it is perfectly
clear that the witness is mistaken and that the answer cannot possibly tend to
incriminate. 49
Though the expediency argument is not strong enough to influence the
Court to drastically change the means of determining the validity of a fifth
amendment claim, it might support an additional alternative to those set out
42. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
43. In summary, if subpoenaed documents cannot be examined by a trial
court and some testimony be compelled (perhaps, both testimony and doc-
uments to be reviewed in camera by the court), frivolous claims of self-
incrimination will result in the loss of much relevant evidence to litigants,
thus severely damaging the judicial, truth-finding process.
Petitioner's contempt conviction should be upheld and this Court is re-
spectfully urged to ground its decision on permitting some inquiry into an
assertion of the privilege of self-incrimination by a trial court.
Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 5-6.
44. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 204 (1942) provides: "[A] witness in an action
is entitled under Rule 203 to refuse to disclose a matter, if he claims a privilege so to
refuse on the ground that it will incriminate him, and the judge finds that the matter
will incriminate the witness" (emphasis added).
45. 25 F. Cas. 38, 40 (No. 14,692e) (C.C. Va. 1807); see note 18 supra and ac-
companying text.
46. 341 U.S. 479 (1951); see notes 17 and 19 supra and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955). See also B. JONES
ON EVIDENCE § 22:6 (6th ed. 1972).
48. Some states adhere to an earlier test which offers a more balanced and expedient
approach. A classic statement of that test is: "Mhe court must see, from the circum-
stances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give,
that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being com-
pelled to answer." Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365 (1917); see C. MCCOR-
MICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 129, at 271 (1st ed. 1954).
49. 341 U.S. at 488.
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in Ryan, especially when the incriminating evidence consists of documents or
records. 50 If a witness's claim of privilege has been overruled by a trial
judge, it would seem reasonable to allow the witness to decide whether an in
camera inspection would be to his benefit. 51 If, for example, a witness is
unsure about the validity of his claim, he may not desire to take the drastic
course of noncompliance coupled with the possibility of a final adjudication
of contempt. Of course, even after an in camera inspection by the judge, the
other alternatives in Ryan should still be available to a witness if the judge
still feels that the claim is invalid. Thus, an in camera alternative, used
before a witness's decision is made as to the two alternatives in Ryan,5 2
would expedite proceedings to some degree and at the same time keep intact
a witness's fifth amendment rights.
III. CONCLUSION
In Maness, the Court took no new strides in the development of the law
surrounding the fifth amendment privilege or, more specifically, the law
concerning an attorney's advice to his client about the privilege. The Court
did make clear its position that a lawyer's advice to his client about the
privilege is of paramount importance and, therefore, any good faith advice
concerning the privilege should not be subject to the possible chilling effect
that a threat of contempt can produce.
Though Maness was perhaps an inappropriate vehicle, the Court did not
discuss any pragmatic considerations involved in the determination of the
validity of a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. The addition of
an in camera alternative to the present alternatives set out in Ryan, without
forfeiting those alternatives after the inspection, appears to be consistent with
the Court's position concerning the determination of the validity of a fifth
amendment claim and should, therefore, be adopted.
Bruce John Stensrud
Pre-Judgment Seizures and the Due Process Clause:
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.
After bringing suit against defendant corporation on an alleged indebted-
ness, plaintiff obtained a writ of garnishment on defendant's bank account.
Defendant attacked as unconstitutional the Georgia statutes1 authorizing the
50. In a situation similar to the instant case an in camera inspection of possibly
obscene magazines would seem most appropriate and expedient.
51. An example in which a witness might not choose the in camera alternative
would be in a non-jury case. Also, a witness could decline to choose the in camera al-
ternative for the simple reason that he does not trust the judge.
52. 402 U.S. at 531-32. The two alternatives are: (1) compliance with a subse-
quent motion to suppress at a later criminal trial, and (2) noncompliance with the
concomitant possibility of a final adjudication of contempt if the witness's claims are
rejected on appeal.
1. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-101 to -104, -401 (1974).
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garnishment. Under these statutes a writ of garnishment may be issued in
pending actions upon plaintiff's affidavit containing conclusory allegations
only without the participation of a judge, provided that plaintiff file a bond
for double the amount in controversy. The Georgia garnishment statutes
failed to provide for pre-seizure notice to defendant, or for an early hearing
at which plaintiff creditor was required to prove facts supporting the grounds
upon which the writ was issued. Defendant could dissolve the garnishment
only by filing a bond protecting the plaintiff against loss. The Georgia
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statutes, 2 and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.3  Held, reversed and remanded:
The Georgia garnishment statutes do not satisfy the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment in that they place garnished property beyond the use
of a defendant during litigation on the basis of a writ issued merely on plain-
tiff's conclusory allegations without judicial participation, and without notice
or the opportunity for an early hearing. This procedure denies due process
of law even though the garnishment may be dissolved upon the filing of a
bond by defendant. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. 601 (1975).
I. REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects an individual
from the taking of his property by a state through its judicial processes with-
out due process of law.4 The United States Supreme Court has developed
two fundamental concepts in the area of procedural due process. In the first
of these principles, the Court has recognized that parties whose rights are af-
fected by a state's judicial processes are entitled to a hearing and, in order
to effectuate that right, are entitled to notice. 5 The second principle, a corol-
lary of the first, is that the notice and the opportunity for a hearing "must
be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
Within these concepts, the Court has not adhered to any rigid formula in
determining whether the requirements of procedural due process have been
met.7 The form of the requisite hearing need only be "appropriate to the
nature of the case" depending on the nature of the interests involved and
2. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 231 Ga. 260, 201 S.E.2d 321
(1973), rev'd, 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
3. 417 U.S. 907 (1974).
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any state deprive any person of
... property without due process of law").
5. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863); see Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385(1914); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274
(1876).
6. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
7. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ("The very nature of
due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginative situation"); Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945) (The
requirements of due process of law "are not technical, nor is any particular form of
procedure necessary."); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 35'1 (1938)
(due process of law guarantees "no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial
rights").
8. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
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the availability and nature of subsequent proceedings. 9 The hearing require-
ment is similarly broad. Traditionally, the states have been limited only by
the requirement that the opportunity for a hearing must be given before the
property is taken, 10 except in extraordinary situations in which a valid state
interest justifies postponing the hearing until after the event."'
II. PRE-JUDGMENT SEIZURES AND DUE PROCESS
There are generally three types of statutory pre-judgment seizure provi-
sions: attachment,' 2 garnishment,' 3 and sequestration.' The application of
due process considerations to these proceedings is a new development in the
law evolving essentially through three cases decided by the Supreme Court
since 1969.'5 The Supreme Court first squarely addressed the issue of wheth-
9. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
11. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971). These situations must be
truly unusual. The Court has allowed outright seizure without opportunity for a prior
hearing only in a few limited situations. First, in each case, the seizure has been
necessary to secure an important governmental or public interest. Second, the need for
very prompt action 'has been compelling. Third, the state has exercised strict control over
this use of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a government
official who determined under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute that the seizure
was necessary in the particular case. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972). Pre-
hearing seizure was upheld in the following cases: Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of misbranded drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S.
245 (1947) (seizure of assets of a financially troubled savings bank); Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (seizure of back taxes owed the federal govern-
ment); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of
contaminated food shipments).
12. The effect of an attachment is to place a lien on a defendant's property.
Typically, it is used to furnish security for the satisfaction of a judgment which the
plaintiff might ultimately obtain. The purpose of such an attachment is to prevent a
debtor from disposing of or removing his property from the state for the purpose of
defrauding his creditors. Attachment may also be used to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant who owns property within the state. Harrison v. Morris,
370 F. Supp. 142, 146-47 (D.S.C. 1974). Unlike sequestration, an attachment does not
deprive defendant physically of his property, since only defendant's ability to remove,
conceal, or dispose of his property is impeded. Technically, the property remains in the
hands of the court until judgment. If plaintiff obtains a judgment the property may be
sold to satisfy it. Otherwise the lien is removed, and defendant may again freely dispose
of his property. 370 F. Supp. at 148-49. A general discussion of attachment may be
found in H. OLECK, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 30 (1953).
13. Garnishment is similar to attachment and is often considered a specialized type
of attachment. Typically the procedure is to place a lien on the property and credits of a
debtor, which are in the possession of, or owed to the debtor by a third party who is
called the garnishee. Frank F. Fasi Supply Co. v. Wigwam Inv. Co., 308 F. Supp. 59, 60-
61 (D. Hawaii 1969). A good discussion comparing garnishment and attachment can be
found in Comment, Constitutional Law-Garnishment-Prejudgment Wage Garnish-
ment, In Absence of Condition Requiring the Special Protection of a State or Creditor
Interest Violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 22 VAND. L
REV. 1400, 1401-02 (1969).
14. Sequestration statutes provide a method whereby property claimed by each of
two parties can be brought within the protection of the court while title determination is
pending. Today it is most often employed in consumer credit situations. In other states
the procedure is known as detinue, ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 918-36 (Supp. 1973); claim and
delivery, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-472 to -484 (Supp. 1974); and replevin, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1821 (1967). An excellent discussion of replevin can be found in Comment,
LaPrease and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 886 (1960).
15. Prior to 1969, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of pre-judgment seizures three times and in each case upheld the validity of state summary
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er state laws authorizing pre-judgment seizures denied an individual due
process of law in Sniadach v. Family Finance Co.16 Mrs. Sniadach attacked
the constitutionality of the Wisconsin procedure17 by which her wages had
been garnished.' 8 Justice Douglas, speaking for seven members of the Court,
determined that there had been a deprivation of property by state action en-
titling the wage earner to due process. 19 The question faced was whether
the interim seizure of wages without a chance to be heard violated that con-
stitutional requirement. 20 Because of the absence of any extraordinary state
or creditor interest which would justify such a summary procedure, the Court
declared the Wisconsin statutes unconstitutional. 21  However, the scope of
precedent laid in Sniadach was unclear since Justice Douglas had emphasized
that the nature of the property affected had a distinct influence on the re-
quirements of due process and had noted the particularly odious nature of
wage garnishments.22
Immediately following the Sniadach decision there was substantial doubt
as to whether due process demanded the same treatment in other pre-judg-
ment seizures dealing with other types of property. 23  That doubt seemed
clearly resolved by Fuentes v. Shevin,24 a case in which consumers in Florida
seizure provisions. In Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), the Court upheld an
attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in the state court. In Coffin Bros. & Co. v.
Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928), it upheld the attachment of the assets of a failing bank.
Both cases involved the kind of extraordinary situation discussed supra note 11. The
interests involved in the third case were much less clear. In a per curiam opinion the
Court simply cited Ownbey and Coffin Bros. as controlling. McKay v. McInnes, 279
U.S. 820 (1929). As regards essential procedural due process, McKay cannot stand for
any more than was established in the Coffin Bros. and Ownbey cases on which the Court
relied completely. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969) (Harlan,
J., concurring). For a discussion of pre-Sniadach decisions, see Note, Procedural Due
Process-The Prior Hearing Rule and the Demise of Ex Parte Remedies, 53 B.U.L.
REV. 41, 42-46 (1973).
16. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
17. WIS. STAT. §§ 267.04(1), .18(2)(a) (1957).
18. After bringing suit alleging a $420 debt owed by Mrs. Sniadach, Family Finance
brought a wage garnishment action against her employer who promptly turned one-half
of the debtor's salary over to the court in accordance with the Wisconsin statutes.
19. 395 U.S. at 342. This deprivation clearly existed even though Mrs. Sniadach was
still entitled to a hearing determining the validity of the debt action at the trial of the
suit brought against her. Id. at 342.
20. Id. at 340.
21. Id. at 339.
22. Id. at 340-41. Mr. Justice Douglas's majority opinion emphasized the socially
harmful nature of wage garnishments in denying the existence of a valid state interest
which would justify the summary seizure and satisfy due process.
23. Sniadach spawned much litigation. Eight states declared their whole garnishment
statutes invalid. Four held all but wage garnishments valid. Five states invalidated their
sequestrations provisions, while four upheld them. Four attachment statutes were de-
clared unconstitutional, and five were upheld. Compare Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp.
614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324(9th Cir. 1973) (repossession of motor vehicles invalid); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture
Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (procedure for repossession of household fur-
nishings invalid); Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d
13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971) (statute allowing attachment of bank account unconstitu-
tional); with Brunswick Coip. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970) (replevin of
bowling alley equipment upheld); Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011(N.D. Ga. 1971) (wage garnishment portion of garnishment statutes overturned without
overturning other garnishment provisions); Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645 (D.
Md. 1971) (replevin of personal property upheld). An excellent analysis of this contro-
versy is Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach: Flower or Weed?, 78 CoM. L.J. 245 (1970).
24. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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and Pennsylvania, who had purchased goods under revolving credit plans,25
attacked state statutes2 6 which authorized the summary seizure of chattels un-
der a writ of replevin. 27  The Court refused to draw distinctions between var-
ious kinds of property and the differing interests held by the parties in the
property subject to seizure. 28  Determining that there was no extraordinary
situation which would justify the summary seizure,2 9 the Court held that due
process had been denied by the replevin provision insofar as it denied the
right to a hearing before the chattels were taken from the possessor.3 0
The Fuentes decision had an enormous impact as both state and federal
courts quickly invalidated a wide range of creditor collection devices.3' Yet,
less than two years later, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,82 the Court retreated
from the strict requirement of notice and a pre-seizure hearing established
in the Fuentes decision. In Mitchell the Court was asked to consider the
constitutionality of Louisiana statutory sequestration provisions33 which pro-
vided for pre-judgment seizure of property without the requirement of a prior
hearing.34 Mr. Justice White, speaking for five members of the Court, found
Fuentes distinguishable.3 5  In pre-judgment sequestrations in which con-
sumer goods are seized, often the property is not solely that of the defendant
debtor; both creditor and debtor have substantial property interests in the se-
questered property. Recognizing that both interests must be protected, the
majority concluded that the Louisiana statutory procedure affected "a con-
25. In Fuentes, debtor, a Florida resident, purchased consumer durables. Firestone,
the creditor, retained title, but Mrs. Fuentes was entitled to possession. With $200
remaining to be paid, a dispute developed, Mrs. Fuentes stopped payment, and Firestone
sought replevin. In the Pennsylvania companion case, three of the four appellants,
purchasers of personal property under conditional sales contracts, attacked replevin of
the property after defaults in the contract. The fourth, engaged in a dispute with her
former husband, fought replevin of their child's personal belongings.
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01-.07, .08, .10, .13 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§
1821 (1967); PA. R. Civ. P. 1073.
27. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
28. 407 U.S. at 88. The Court thus rejected the argument based on a very narrow
reading of Sniadach and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (where the Court held
there must be a prior hearing before the termination of welfare benefits) that a prior
hearing is required only with respect to the deprivation of basically "necessary" items. Id.
at 88-90.
29. Id. at 90-93.
30. Id. at 96. The Court emphasized the following factors in its decision: the
statutes did not limit the summary seizure to special situations demanding prompt action,
e.g., where there was a danger that debtor would destroy or conceal the goods; the ab-
sence of effective state control of the proceedings since no state official participated in
the decision to seek a writ, no state official evaluated the ground for the writ and there
was no requirement that the creditor provide the court any information as to why it
sought the writ. Id. at 93.
31. See, e.g., Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.
1973) (garagemen's liens); Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972) (landlord's
liens); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973) (real
property attachments); Hattell v. Public Serv. Co., 350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1972)
(utility shutoffs). The decision also raised a great deal of discussion among commenta-
tors. Perhaps the best discussion can be found in Clark and Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes,
and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355 (1973).
32. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
33. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 281-83, 325, 2373, 3501, 3504, 3506, 3508, 3571, 3574,
3576 (1961).
34. W. T. Grant Co., the creditor, sought the writ alleging an unpaid balance of
$574.17 owed to it by Mitchell on the credit purchases of consumer durables. 416 U.S. at
601.
35. Id. at 612-13.
[Vol. 29
stitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties"8 6 and de-
termined that "the mere absence of a prior hearing was not a denial of due
process."' 37 In particular, the Court examined the procedure established by
the Louisiana statutes and found several ways in which the debtor was pro-
tected, all of which were absent in Fuentes 8s In Louisiana the writ of se-
questration could issue only when the defendant was in a position to conceal,
dispose of, waste, or remove the property,89 and then only when the nature
of the claim and amount as well as the grounds relied upon for the issuance
of the writ "clearly appear from specific facts."' 40 The Court also noted that
the showing of grounds for the writ must be made to a judicial officer, who
alone could authorize the writ. 41 Finally, although the writ was obtainable
ex parte without notice or hearing prior to seizure, the debtor could im-
mediately seek dissolution of the writ unless the creditor proved the grounds
on which the writ issued. 42
Mitchell indicated that the Supreme Court had stepped back from the prin-
ciple stated in Fuentes.48 As long as the statutory procedure for pre-judg-
ment seizures reflected a "constitutional accommodation" between the
interests of the debtor and creditor such that the debtor's possessory interests
in the seized property were sufficiently protected by the particular features
of the state's procedure, due process could be satisfied without either notice
or a hearing prior to the seizure. 44  Though Justice Powell, concurring, ex-
pressed the view that Mitchell overruled Fuentes,48 no such intention was
expressed by the majority, and the question of how far the Court had re-
treated from Fuentes remained the subject of much speculation. 46
36. Id. at 607.
37. Id.
38. The Court also noted two basic protections which were present in Fuentes. The
creditor had to post a bond for double the amount in controversy to enable the debtor to
collect damages if his claim on the merits was ultimately disallowed, and the debtor
could regain possession by filing his own bond to protect the creditor. LA. CODE CIV. P.
arts. 3501, 3507-08, 3574 (1961). See also Johnson, Attachment and Sequestration:
Provisional Remedies Under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 38 TuL. L. REv. 1,
21-22 (1963).
39. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3571 (1961).
40. Id. art. 3501.
41. Id. arts. 281-83. Article 281 confined the authority to issue writs of sequestration
to the judge in Orleans Parish, the parish where this case arose. Articles 282-83 provided
that the county clerk also had the authority to issue the writ in every other parish. The
Court specifically limited its approval of the Louisiana procedure to that in Orleans
Parish. 416 U.S. at 611.
42. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3506 (1961).
43. "Mitchell . . . marks a substantial retreat by the Supreme Court from prior
precedent relating to the procedural due process requirement of prior notice and hearing
generally and to the constitutional validity of creditors' prejudgment seizure remedies
particularly." Hobbs, Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.: The 1974 Revised Edition of
Consumer Due Process, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 182 (1974). See Note, Constitutional
Law - Due Process - Supreme Court Moderates Prior Notice and Hearing Require-
ments for Provisional Seizures, 49 TUL. L. REV. 467 (1975); Note, Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant: The Resurrection of Replevin, 36 U. Prrr. L. REV. 537 (1974); Note, Changing
Concepts of Consumer Due Process in the Supreme Court-The New Conservative
Majority Bids Farewell to Fuentes, 60 IowA L. REV. 262 (1974).
44. 416 U.S. at 607.
45. Id. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring). This position has been supported by one
authoritative commentary, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REV. 13, 71-72
(1974), and by a three-judge federal panel, Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432, 436
(S.D. Fla. 1974).
46. See notes 43, 45 supra. A major question seemed to involve the degree of
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Il. NORTH GEORGIA FINISHING, INC. v. DI-CHEM, INC.
In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.4 7 the Supreme Court
held that Georgia statutes authorizing garnishment of a debtor's bank account
without notice or a prior hearing violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, 48 stating that the Georgia statute was vulnerable for the
same reasons as the Pennsylvania and Florida statutes declared unconstitu-
tional in Fuentes.4 9  The Court further recognized that the Georgia proce-
dure possessed none of the "saving characteristics" of the Louisiana seques-
tration statute examined in Mitchell.50 Specifically, the Georgia garnishment
writ was issuable on plaintiff's affidavit containing only conclusory allega-
tions,5s and no judicial participation was required for the writ to issue.5 2
Moreover, there was no early hearing provision at which time creditor must
prove the grounds relied on for issuance of the writ, and the debtor's only
means of dissolving the writ was to post a bond protecting creditor.5 3 Fol-
lowing the Mitchell decision, a number of states were left to wonder wheth-
er their pre-judgment statutes were saved by a sufficient "constitutional
accommodation" 54 short of pre-seizure notice and hearing.55  Though in
many ways the Court's decision in North Georgia Finishing was an enigmatic
one,56 it helps to establish, together with Fuentes and Mitchell, a basic,
if somewhat incomplete, framework within which states may examine their
statutes.
flexibility Mitchell allowed. Compare Guzman v. Western State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262(D.N.D. 1974) (North Dakota replevin statute upheld even though it did not requirejudicial supervision), and Woods v. Tennessee, 378 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D. Tenn. 1974)(Tennessee replevin statute upheld even though it did not require a post-seizure hearing),
with Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), prob. juris.
noted, 95 S. Ct. 1556, 43 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1975) (New York attachment statute
mechanically struck down when it met all the criteria of Mitchell except the prompt post-
seizure hearing provision). This later decision has been criticized. See McLaughlin,
Attachment Statute Unconstitutional: Wholly or in Part?, 172 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1974).
47. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
48. Id. at 606. The same result was also reached in Morrow Elec. Co. v. Cruse, 370
F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1974), where subsequent to the ruling by the Georgia Supreme
Court, a three-judge federal panel declared the same provisions unconstitutional.
49. 419 U.S. at 606.
50. Id. at 607.
51. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-103 (1974).
52. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-102 (1974). This provision authorizes even a creditor's
attorney, who need have no personal knowledge of the facts, to obtain the required
affidavit.
53. GA. CoDE ANN. § 46-401 (1974).
54. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
55. The Texas sequestration statute was one which came under attack. Garcia v.
Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974). There, a federal district court declared
unconstitutional the Texas provision. TEvx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (1960); TEx.
R. Civ. P. 696-716. The court found the sequestration statutes lacked the constitutional
accommodations present in the Georgia sequestration statutes. In particular, while the
Texas provisions required allegations of facts in order for writs to issue, they did not
demand the specific allegation that the creditor feared loss, removal, or destruction of the
property, or that the writ issue from a judge. Finally, there was no early hearing
provision at which time there had to be a showing of probable cause if the writ was to be
continued. In response to the Court's decisions in Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing,
Texas recently enacted an amended article 6840. Although it stops short of providing a
pre-seizure hearing, it does provide the basic accommodations found acceptable by the
Court in Mitchell. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (Supp. 1975), amending ch. 44,§ 1, [1887] Tex. Laws, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAws OF TEXAS 828 (1898). The reaction of the
courts in other states is discussed supra note 46.
56. See notes 63-69 infra and accompanying text.
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If none of the "saving characteristics" 57 of the Louisiana statutes are
present, then it seems clear that state statutes authorizing any type of pre-
judgment seizure violate due process of law. To this extent, Justice Powell's
view, expressed in Mitchell,58 that Fuentes v. Shevin had been overruled, is
refuted. This decision indicated that the Fuentes decision was still viable
on the particular facts there involved.59 While Fuentes and Mitchell ex-
pressed the requirement of procedural safeguards in statutory replevin or se-
questration procedures, North Georgia Finishing illustrated that such safe-
guards are also required in pre-judgment garnishment provisions. In addi-
tion, North Georgia Finishing also established that the principles of Fuentes
and Mitchell are applicable to business corporations as well as "consumers
who are victims of contracts of adhesion and who might be irreparably dam-
aged by temporary deprivation of household necessities . ."60 Rejecting
plaintiff's argument that those cases"1 were limited to the application of due
process to such consumers, the Court held that the possibility of irreparable
injury inherent in a pre-judgment seizure is sufficiently great, even in a com-
mercial setting, so that some procedural safeguards are required to prevent
the risk of error in the seizure process.62
The Supreme Court has left many crucial questions unanswered. Justice
Blackmun, dissenting, argued that the "Court now has embarked on a case-
by-case analysis . . . of the respective state statutes in this area. That road
is a long and unrewarding one, and provides no satisfactory answers to issues
of constitutional magnitude." 03  In the meantime, many states are left to
ponder the combined effect of Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia Finish-
ing on their statutes. 4 In Mitchell the Court indicated characteristics which
distinguished the Louisiana sequestration statutes from those struck down in
Fuentes.65 Yet it was unclear whether the basis of the Mitchell holding was
a new recognition of a need to accommodate the conflicting interests of
debtor and secured creditor in sequestered property or the presence of proce-
dural safeguards in the Louisiana system.66 While the Court in North
Georgia Finishing did state that the Georgia garnishment statutes had none
of the saving characteristics of the Louisiana system, 67 it did not resolve the
question. The garnishment process does not involve the conflicting interests
of two parties, each claiming an interest in the seized property. Rather, pre-
judgment attachment and garnishment allow seizure of a debtor's property
by a simple creditor who has no interest in the particular property seized.68
57. S'ee notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
58. 416 U.S. at 623 (Powell, ., concurring).
59. Mr. Justice Stewart, borrowing a line from Mark Twain, remarks in his
concurring opinion: "It is gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuentes v.Shevin seems to have been greatly exaggerated." 419 U.S. at 608.
60. 419 U.S. at 608.
61. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972).
62. 419 U.S. at 608.
63. 419 U.S. at 620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see note 82 infra.
64. See notes 62-63 supra and 65-69 Infra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
67. 419 U.S. at 607.
68. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
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Though not discussed by the Court in North Georgia Finishing this aspect
might be enough to distinguish it from Mitchell. The lack of conflicting prop-
erty claims and, therefore, ,the lack of any valid state interest in attachment-
garnishment situations might have allowed the Court to decide that a pre-
judgment provision violated due process of law, even if the procedural safe-
guards of Mitchell had been present in the Georgia garnishment statutes. Yet,
while the North Georgia Finishing decision provided no indication of the sig-
nificance of the "constitutional accommodation" of conflicting property
interests concept, since the concept had no application, the Court's failure
to discuss the matter cannot be read as a rejection of the idea. The Court's
failure to answer this question leaves the states in continuing doubt as to the
validity of their pre-judgment attachment and garnishment statutes absent
pre-seizure notice and hearing.
Furthermore, North Georgia Finishing offered no further definition of
the "saving characteristics" concept. Specifically, the constitutionality of a
state pre-judgment seizure provision requiring judicial issuance of the
writ and a sworn allegation that the creditor fears destruction or loss of prop-
erty, but none of the other "saving characteristics" discussed in Mitchell,69
has not been determined. The statutes considered in Mitchell, Fuentes, and
North Georgia Finishing represented only the boundaries of a broad area, and
while statutory procedures substantially the same as those in Louisiana
are clearly acceptable under the principles of the due process clause, there
are many potential statutory procedures which may differ somewhat from
the approved Louisiana sequestration provisions. The Court gave little
hint in Mitchell of the nature of the minimum procedural safeguards which
are constitutionally required by the due process clause. In North Georgia
Finishing the Court likewise refused to indicate the minimum procedural
safeguards required of a pre-judgment seizure statute and did not address
itself to any of the potential pre-judgment seizure provisions which may be
attacked in the future.
The Court seemed intent on offering as little justification as possible for
its decision in North Georgia Finishing.70 In many ways this reflects a con-
tinuing divergence in views existing among the members of the Court, repre-
sented on the one hand by a wide reading of Fuentes, and on the other, by
pre-Sniadach thought.71 The Court has still not taken a definitive position
on pre-judgment seizures and due process. North Georgia Finishing repre-
69. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
70. 419 U.S. at 614 (Blackmun, J., dissenting): "The Court, it seems to me, does
little more than make very general and very sparse comparisons of the present case with
Fuentes v. Shevin on the one hand, and with Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. on the other
71. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart have consistently supported
the wide reading of Fuentes. Justices Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist have consistently
voted to narrow Fuentes. Justices Powell and White were the swing votes, siding with the
majority in both Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing. For an analysis of the impact of
the Nixon appointees see Note, Changing Concepts of Consumer Due Process in the
Supreme Court-The New Conservative Majority Bids Farewell to Fuentes, 60 IowA L.
REv. 262 (1974). It should be noted that Fuentes was a 4-3 short-court decision. Justices
Rehnquist and Powell had been confirmed but not yet seated. Therefore, the precise
impact of Nixon's appointees cannot be determined.
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sents a victory for those favoring a Fuentes outlook, but that victory is neither
total nor permanent since the decision leaves the Court a wide field of con-
troversy remaining with regard to provisions not as clearly deficient as those
in Georgia.
However, it is possible to venture the prediction that judicial issuance of
the writ and a prompt post-seizure hearing will be the basis of the minimum
constitutional requirements of due process. Without such provisions it seems
likely the statute will fail since the Court in Mitchell distinguished the
Fuentes case on these points 72 and emphasized that under the applicable
Louisiana law there is "judicial control of the process from beginning to
end."'7'  North Georgia Finishing gives additional support to this view by its
focus on these defects in the Georgia garnishment statute.74
Such a response should be the beginning of a sensible approach to the pro-
cedural problems of pre-judgment seizures and should signal a return to the
traditional flexible standards of the due process clause. 75  The Court should
recognize that in its efforts to establish an equitable balance between the
rights of the creditor and those of the debtor its decision in Fuentes went
too far toward creating a rigid impracticable rule not in accordance with tra-
ditional notions of due process. 76 Mitchell should be seen as a flexible com-
promise between the conflicting property interests of parties in sequestered
goods, giving rise to the kind of extraordinary situation where a summary
seizure is appropriate, while still recognizing and protecting the interests of
the debtor.77
Finally, North Georgia Finishing should be viewed as a traditional applica-
tion of due process principles to garnishment and attachment statutes where
absent the extraordinary situation present in sequestration there can be no
taking without a prior hearing. Within this national framework the pre-judg-
ment seizure provisions and the due process clause can exist in harmony.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although faced with the same general question for the fourth time in five
years,78 the Court refused to make North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc. a definitive announcement of its position on the due process require-
ments applicable to state pre-judgment seizure provisions, reflecting the fact
that the Court itself has not yet decided what those requirements should be.
In this rapidly changing area of law in which the Court has seemed to estab-
lish a rule,7 9 and implicitly overrule it,a° and then modify the new rule,8 ' the
72. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
73. 416 U.S. at 616-18.
74. 419 U.S. at 607; see notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 4-11 supra and accompanying text.
76. Id.
77. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
78. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 608, 620 (1975).
79. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
80. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). Though the majority was
able to distinguish Fuentes, Mr. Justice Powell, concurring, and Mr. Justice Stewart,
dissenting, expressed the opinion that Mitchell overruled Fuentes. See note 45 supra and
accompanying text.
81. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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final outcome remains uncertain. The only certainty is that the Court has
indeed embarked on a state-by-state analysis of pre-judgment seizure provi-
sions82 and that a great deal of controversy among the members of the Court
remains to be concluded before a definitive rule is established.
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. established that a statutory
scheme possessing none of the "saving characteristics" of the Louisiana se-
questration statute examined in Mitchell is unconstitutional. Although it is
possible to predict that at least a prompt post-seizure hearing and judicial
issuance of the writ will be required by due process principles, a definitive
announcement of the constitutional minimum will have to await a later case.
E. John Justema
82. Even before the decision in North Georgia Finishing one commentator suggested
that the abandonment of the rigid Fuentes standard in Mitchell would require a case-by-
case clarification. Phillips, Revolution and Counterrevolution; The Supreme Court on
Creditors' Remedies, 3 FoR)HAM URw.N U. 1, 10-11 (1974).
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